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THE DONOR CLASS:  CAMPAIGN FINANCE,
DEMOCRACY, AND PARTICIPATION
SPENCER OVERTON†
As a result of disparities in resources, a small, wealthy, and homogenous
donor class makes large contributions that fund the bulk of American politics.
Even in the aftermath of recent campaign reforms, the donor class effectively de-
termines which candidates possess the resources to run viable campaigns.  This
reality undermines the democratic value of widespread participation.  Instead
of preventing “corruption” or equalizing funds between candidates, the primary
goal of campaign reform should be to reduce the impact of wealth disparities
and empower more citizens to participate in the funding of campaigns.  On av-
erage, candidates should receive a larger percentage of their funds from a
greater number of people in smaller contribution amounts.  Reforms such as es-
tablishing matching funds and providing tax credits for smaller contributions,
combined with emerging technology, would enable more Americans to make con-
tributions and would enhance their voices in our democracy.
INTRODUCTION
Opponents of campaign finance reform embrace a relatively lais-
sez-faire reliance on private markets to fund campaigns for public of-
fice.  Although they champion the individual rights of those who con-
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trol resources, antireformers largely overlook the structural impact of
vast disparities in wealth on the ability of most citizens to make finan-
cial contributions.1
This Article uses the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in McConnell
v. FEC2 to argue that the law should play a central role in reducing the
impact of disparities in wealth on political participation.  McConnell
upheld large parts of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(BCRA)3—a regulatory overhaul that banned unlimited soft money
contributions and restricted corporate and union spending on politi-
cal campaigns.  In so doing, the Court in McConnell acknowledged the
adverse impact that concentrated wealth has on widespread demo-
cratic participation and self-government.4  In the aftermath of the re-
forms upheld in McConnell, however, disparities in wealth continue to
affect participation.
A relatively small and wealthy group of individuals—the “donor
class”—gives large hard money5 contributions that fund the bulk of
1
See, e.g., Lillian BeVier, Campaign Finance Regulation:  Less, Please, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1115, 1118 (2002) (arguing that disparities in wealth do not make the case for regulat-
ing independent expenditures for election-related speech because many other sources
of unequal political influence will remain); Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and
Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1056 (1996)
(indicating the author’s opposition to the belief “that modern campaigns have been
corrupted by big money”); cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam)
(invalidating spending limits and reasoning that “the concept that government may
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative
voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment”).
2
540 U.S. 93, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003).
3
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat.
81 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18, 28, 36, 47 U.S.C.).
4
See infra Part I.B. for a discussion of the reasoning of McConnell.
5
Money that is subject to the Federal Election Campaign Act’s disclosure re-
quirements and source and amount limitations is known as “hard” or “federal” money.
See McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 648-49 (explaining that contributions made with funds sub-
ject to the Federal Election Campaign Act’s requirements and limitations are called
“federal” or “hard” money, whereas contributions intended to influence elections and
made with funds not subject to the Act are called “nonfederal” or “soft” money).
While BCRA banned unlimited “soft” or “nonfederal” money contributions to federal
parties (money previously not subject to regulation by the Federal Election Campaign
Act), the law increased the amount of “hard money” an individual may contribute to a
federal candidate from $1000 to $2000, and it increased the annual aggregate amount
of hard money an individual may give to candidates, PACs, and parties from $25,000 to
$95,000.  BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, secs. 101, 307, §§ 315, 323, 116 Stat. 81, 82, 102–
03 (2002).  Even before BCRA restricted soft money and increased the hard money lim-
its, hard money was the primary source of candidate and party funding.  See PUB.
CAMPAIGN, HARD FACTS ON HARD MONEY (2001), at http://www.publicampaign.org/
publications/studies/hardfacts/hardfactsfull.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2004) (“Hard
money remained the dominant source of campaign funding in the 2000 election cycle
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American politics.6  Although approximately 51.3% of voting-age
Americans cast a ballot in the 2000 general presidential election,7 less
than 2% contributed $200 or more to a presidential or congressional
candidate.8  In the 2003-2004 election cycle, contributions of between
outweighing party soft money by a ratio of 4.4 to 1.”).
6
See Bob Herbert, Editorial, The Donor Class, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1998, at 15 (“I
doubt that many people are aware of just how elite and homogenous the donor class
[to political campaigns] is.  It’s a tiny group—just one-quarter of 1 percent of the
population—and it is not representative of the rest of the nation.”).  For the purposes
of this Article, the donor class consists of natural persons who have made at least one
contribution over $200 to a federal candidate, party, or PAC within the last two elec-
tion cycles.
7
See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, VOTER REGISTRATION AND TURNOUT 2000, at
http://www.fec.gov/pages/2000turnout/reg&to00.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2004)
(reporting that official turnout for the 2000 presidential election was 105,586,274 vot-
ers, or 51.3% of the voting-age population).
8
Anne Gearan, Supreme Court Eyes Campaign Finance Laws, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept.
5, 2003, available at 2003 WL 63458717.  The precise percentage of voting-age Ameri-
cans who contributed to a federal candidate, PAC, or party is not ascertainable because
the FEC requires recipients to report only donations of more than $200 in an itemized
report of any detail.  See 28 U.S.C. § 434(b), (e) (2000) (requiring identification of
each person who makes a contribution or contributions with an aggregate value ex-
ceeding $200 per year, but allowing recipients to report lesser contributions at their
discretion).  The recipient combines all contributions of $200 or less and reports them
as one total.  Nevertheless, the numbers show that a small class of Americans gives most
of the money collected by federal candidates, parties, and PACs.  In the 2001-2002
election cycle, only 0.22% of the voting-age population in the United States gave a con-
tribution over $200 to a federal congressional candidate, party, or PAC, and this group
accounted for 76% of the funds given to federal candidates by individuals.  ADAM LIOZ
& ALISON CASSADY, U.S. PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, THE ROLE OF MONEY IN THE
2002 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 4 (2003).
Some might assert that the distribution of wealth does not have an adverse impact
on democratic participation because union PACs are funded by deductions from the
dues of millions of union members.  Although this is an important point, unions do
not facilitate the political participation of most Americans.  Less than 6% (just under
sixteen million) are members of a union, see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:  2003, at 432 tbl.658 (123d ed. 2003), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/03statab/labor.pdf, and not all of these indi-
viduals contribute to a union PAC, see 11 C.F.R. § 114.5(a) (2004) (authorizing a union
member to request that the union not use her dues to support political causes).  Un-
ion PACs gave about $52.6 million to federal candidates in the 2000 election cycle, or
about 3.7% of the total $1.423 billion collected.  See 2000 Presidential Race:  Total Raised
and Spent, Ctr. for Responsive Politics (n.d.), at http://www.opensecrets.org/
2000elect/index/AllCands.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2004) (indicating that U.S. presi-
dential candidates collected $375.3 million during the 2000 election cycle); Labor:
PAC Contributions to Federal Candidates 1999-2000, Ctr. for Responsive Politics (n.d.), at
http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/sector.asp?txt=P01&cycle=2000 (last visited Sept.
15, 2004) (indicating union PACs gave $52.6 million to federal candidates during the
2000 election cycle); The Big Picture, 2000 Cycle, The Price of Admission, Ctr. for Respon-
sive Politics (n.d.), at http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/stats.asp?cycle=2000&
type=A&display=T (last visited Sept. 15, 2004) (indicating that U.S. Senate candidates
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$200 and $2000 represented 69% of the money individuals donated to
Republican President George W. Bush and 63% of such money do-
nated to Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry.9
Access to financial resources rather than mere political interest
defines the donor class.10  While only 13.4% of American house-
holds earned at least $100,000 in 2000,11 these households gave 85.7%
of contributions over $200 collected by presidential candidates.12
The problem with money in politics is not simply that a handful of
individuals made $1 million soft money contributions, but also that
relatively few Americans control enough wealth to make contributions
of between $200 and $2000 consistently and comfortably.13  Despite
collected $447.9 million and U.S. House candidates collected $600.3 million during
the 2000 election cycle).
9
Press Release, Campaign Fin. Inst., at tbl.3 (Oct. 4, 2004), avaialable at http://
www.cfinst.org/pr/100404_Table3.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2004).  Contributions of
$1000 or more represented 57% of the funds given by individuals to Bush and 44% of
the money given to Kerry.  Id.
10
See Henry E. Brady et al., Beyond SES:  A Resource Model of Political Participation, 89
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 271, 283 (1995) (“The results are unambiguous:  the major deter-
minant of giving money is having money.  Years of education also matter, but neither
free time nor civic skills affect monetary contributions.” (citation omitted)); E-mail
from Clyde Wilcox, Professor of Government, Georgetown University, to Spencer
Overton, Associate Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School
(July 3, 2004, 12:51:29 EST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Wilcox July 3, 2004
Chart] (indicating that while individuals with family incomes of less than $100,000 ac-
counted for only 14.3% of contributions over $200, they accounted for 73.5% of con-
tributions of $100 and less).
11
CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MONEY INCOME IN THE
UNITED STATES:  2000, at 17 tbl.A-1 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2001pubs/p60-213.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2004).
12
See Wilcox July 3, 2004 Chart, supra note 10 (indicating that of presidential pri-
mary donors in the 2000 election, individuals with family incomes of $100,000 or more
accounted for 85.7% of individual contributors of over $200 and 93.3% of individual
contributors of $1000).  The demographic data Professor Wilcox provided for this Ar-
ticle is based on a survey of 2881 donors, selected randomly, to presidential primary
candidates for the 2000 elections.  The study was organized and managed by Professor
Wilcox and several of his colleagues.  See Clyde Wilcox et al., With Limits Raised, Who
Will Give More?  The Impact of BCRA on Individual Donors, in LIFE AFTER REFORM:  WHEN
THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT MEETS POLITICS 61, 64-65 (Michael J. Malbin
ed., 2003) (explaining the methodology of their study of donors to 2000 presidential
primary candidates); see also Peter Francia et al., Donor  Dissent:  Congressional Contribu-
tors Rethink Giving, PUB. PERSP. July/Aug. 2000, at 29-30 (revealing that 78% of donors
to congressional candidates during the 1996 election cycle had household incomes
over $100,000).
13
The wealthiest fifth of U.S. households controls over 79% of the nation’s
wealth, whereas the bottom two-fifths controls just over 1%.  See Javier Díaz-Giménez et
al., Dimensions of Inequality:  Facts on the U.S. Distributions of Earnings, Income, and Wealth,
FED. RES. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS Q. REV., Spring 1997, at 3, 13 tbl.6 (listing the wealth
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the reluctance of antireformers to grapple with disparities in financial
resources among individuals, the law’s conception of distribution mat-
ters.
Prior to McConnell, a handful of reformers envisioned wealth as
one of the principal problems, but their focus on formal equality14 had
shortcomings.  Granted, adopting equality as the goal provided a
normative baseline, and it allowed the reformers to overcome unin-
spiring regulatory detail by invoking civil rights analogies.  By focusing
on formal equality, however, the reformers selected an unattainable
ideal.  A newspaper editorial endorsing one of the candidates, for ex-
ample, could throw off precise equality.  In addition, by pushing for
equal public funding paid directly to candidates, some egalitarian re-
formers disregarded the central role that citizens should play in
democratic debate.15  The rigid positions embraced by antireform-
ers and egalitarians framed the debate as a stark choice between unre-
strained liberty and uniform equality.
The focus on these polar extremes detracts from a pressing prob-
lem that persists in the aftermath of BCRA.  Massive disparities in the
distribution of wealth cause disparities in political participation.  The
donor class effectively selects which candidates will be viable through
large hard money contributions.
controlled by the lowest through highest quintiles, respectively, as -0.39, 1.74, 5.72,
13.43, and 79.49).
14
See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter:  A Constitutional Principle of Cam-
paign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1215 (1994) (“In thinking about distributive
justice, I start with the basic premise that all persons have equal intrinsic worth, which I
call the principle of intrinsic equality.”); Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democ-
racy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1,
27-28 (1996) (asserting that “[e]galitarian pluralism aims to equalize the ability of dif-
ferent individuals to affect the political process” and is based on the notion that “dis-
parities in wealth and ability to organize are not relevant to the individual’s right to
influence political outcomes”); Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the
Wealth Primary, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 273, 279 (1993) (declaring that “[t]he purpose
of this Article is to demonstrate that the current campaign finance regime is inconsis-
tent with equal protection or, at the very least, warrants congressional action to vindi-
cate equal protection”).
15
This Article uses the terms “citizen” and “American” to refer to all natural per-
sons, including certain immigrants, eligible to make financial contributions to
candidates under federal law.  See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, CAMPAIGN GUIDE FOR
CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES AND COMMITTEES 28 (2004) (stating that although con-
tributions by foreign nationals are prohibited, an “immigrant is eligible to make a con-
tribution if the immigrant has a ‘green card’ indicating that he or she is lawfully admit-
ted for permanent residence in the United States”), available at http://www.fec.gov/
finance_law.html.
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Part I of this Article reviews two opposing approaches that have
emerged in the law.  The class-blind approach minimizes the signifi-
cance of disparities in wealth and forms the basis of the arguments of
many scholars, politicians, and judges who oppose campaign reform.
In contrast, the class-sensitive vision highlights disparities in access to
resources as a central issue in lawmaking; this approach motivated the
Court in McConnell to tolerate restrictions on soft money contributions
and corporate spending.  Part II examines and reveals the many
shortcomings of the antireformers’ assertion that the impact of wealth
on democratic participation warrants minimal concern.  To reduce
the impact of disparities in resources and broaden participation be-
yond the donor class, Part III proposes a goal that candidates, parties,
and political action committees (PACs) receive a much larger per-
centage of their funds from contributors of $100 or less.  Part III also
predicts that matching funds and tax credits for smaller contributions,
combined with innovative use of emerging technology, would move
our political process closer to that objective.
I.  CLASS-BLIND AND CLASS-SENSITIVE APPROACHES TO LAW
Commentators have recognized that legal decisions are influ-
enced by the particular theoretical approach of the decision maker,
which is in turn influenced by certain basic assumptions, beliefs, and
commitments.16  This Part focuses on two different approaches to
lawmaking:  the class-blind approach fails to recognize the signifi-
cance of disparities in wealth, while the class-sensitive vision is cogni-
zant of such issues.
A.  The Class-Blind Approach:  Lawmaking
That Ignores Disparities in Wealth
The class-blind approach to law discourages consideration of rela-
tive differences in wealth among individuals.  The approach accepts
such disparities as an inevitable reality that rarely warrants govern-
ment intervention.  Under this vision, individual citizens are responsi-
ble for securing the resources required or meeting the conditions
necessary to satisfy their wants and needs.
16
See generally Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Systems of Belief in Modern American Law:  A View
From Century’s End, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999) (asserting that disagreements about
rules, doctrine, and policy often arise from six discrete systems of belief, and that these
different beliefs stem from different assumptions, beliefs, and commitments regarding
the world).
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Advocates of the class-blind approach do not regard their indif-
ference to wealth disparities as callousness, but rather as objectivity
that enhances the quality and credibility of decision making.  Con-
scious accounting of disparities in wealth, the argument goes, will
most likely result in class-based factions.  Ambitious politicians tend to
use the divisive rhetoric of class warfare not to enhance fairness for
those with fewer resources, but as an instrument to satisfy their per-
sonal hunger for political power.17  The resentment, discontent, and
hostility that arise threaten the stability of economic markets as well as
government.
Advocates of the class-blind approach harbor a strong commit-
ment to private property, to the priority of private interests over pub-
lic interests, and to bright-line rules and concepts over more nuanced
balancing and compromise.18  The schools of legal and political
thought that lean more toward a class-blind vision include classical
formalism associated with the Lochner decision,19 law and economics,
public choice theory, and libertarianism.20
17
This resembles James Madison’s concern that if the law fails to protect private
property from political redistribution, the propertyless might “unite against the prop-
ertied” and “become the ‘dupes and instruments of ambition.’”  JENNIFER NEDELSKY,
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM:  THE
MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 27-28 (1990) (quoting James Madison, Ob-
servations on Jeffersons’s Draft of a Constitution for Virginia (Oct. 15, 1788), reprinted
in 1 THE FOUNDER’S CONSTITUTION 649, 650 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987)).
18
Cf. Wetlaufer, supra note 16, at 13-14 (describing academic formalists, who typi-
cally lean toward class-blind visions, as possessing “a commitment to the rights of pri-
vate property, the freedom and sanctity of contract, the priority of private over public
interests, and a resistance to legislative reform”).
19
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57-58 (1905) (reasoning that an individual’s
right to enter into contracts was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Proc-
ess Clause and was generally immune from interference by the state).
20
While writers skeptical of legal intervention that alters market distribution
dominate classical formalism, law and economics, and public choice, nothing inherent
in these movements makes them class-blind.  One could argue, for example, that legal
intervention that ensures broad-based distribution of goods like quality public educa-
tion to the poor advances the law and economics goal of wealth maximization.  See
AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 128-29 (1999) (noting that public goods,
“which people consume together rather than separately,” may have a significant influ-
ence on our welfare, thus “[e]fficiency considerations . . . supplement the argument
for equity in supporting public assistance in providing basic education, health facilities,
and other public (or semipublic) goods”); see also LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL,
FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 5, 29 n.26 (2002) (refuting the “common understanding of
normative economic analysis, whereby legal rules are assessed by reference to wealth
maximization or efficiency, criteria that many construe . . . as ignoring distributive
concerns” and the statements by “[s]ome law and economics scholars . . . that distribu-
tion ought not to matter in principle”).
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In the campaign finance context, class-blind themes abound, es-
pecially among those opposed to regulation.  Just as less wealthy indi-
viduals should not suffer discrimination because they cannot afford to
pay a poll tax, wealthier individuals should not face discrimination be-
cause they can afford to contribute and spend more.21  Antireformers
do not see contribution and spending restrictions as “content neu-
tral,” but as measures designed to suppress the views of wealthier indi-
viduals.  Bradley Smith, a leading antireformer, illustrates the point
with the following question:  “[A]re all individuals treated with equal
concern and respect when they are not allowed to equally employ the
fruits of their labors and talents to political action?”22
One strain of the Supreme Court’s campaign finance decisions re-
jects the argument that individual contributions and expenditures
must be restricted to reduce affluent persons’ influence and enhance
the relative ability of the less wealthy to affect elections.  The Court in
Buckley v. Valeo reasoned that “the concept that government may re-
strict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance
the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amend-
ment . . . .”23  Instead of acknowledging disparities in wealth distribu-
tion among citizens, the Court justified contribution limits by focusing
on the potentially corrupting impact of large contributions on elected
officials.24
According to the class-blind assumptions about political participa-
tion underlying Buckley and its progeny, the private economic market
determines the allocation of entitlements to financial resources for
21
Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976) (per curiam) (“The First Amend-
ment’s protection against governmental abridgment of free expression cannot prop-
erly be made to depend on a person’s financial ability to engage in public discus-
sion.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Discrimination, Distribution and Free Speech, 37 ARIZ. L. REV.
439, 440 (1995) (“[T]he Court has extended the free speech principle to protect the
speech rights of the wealthy.”).
22
Bradley A. Smith, The Sirens’ Song:  Campaign Finance Regulation and the First
Amendment, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 40 (1997).  Professor Smith became Chairman of the Fed-
eral Election Commission on January 1, 2004.  For a discussion of the Chairman’s ap-
pointment and first weeks in office, see Thomas B. Edsall, McCain-Feingold Unmade?
New Election Regulator Opposes Campaign Finance Law, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2004, at A19.
23
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49.
24
The Court in Buckley struck down spending limits, however, concluding that in-
dependent expenditures do “not presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent
corruption comparable to those identified with large campaign contributions.”  Id. at 46.
2004] THE DONOR CLASS 81
use in the political sphere.25  The donor class is a natural product of
the market and requires no legal acknowledgment or remedy.26
B.  The Class-Sensitive Approach:  McConnell v. FEC
and Lawmaking That Considers Disparities
In contrast to the class-blind vision of law, the class-sensitive vision
recognizes and sometimes seeks to remedy disparities in private prop-
erty ownership.  Those sensitive to class believe that taking economic
disparities into account furthers understanding of the consequences
of government action or inaction in particular contexts.
The class-sensitive vision is not socialist—it acknowledges that
economic markets featuring private property generally serve impor-
tant functions.  A primary role of law, however, is to advance critical
values that private markets either ignore or undermine.27  These val-
ues may be advanced through a variety of methods, including restric-
tions on activities, financial subsidies, and varying tax burdens and in-
centives.  Although this Article focuses on the campaign finance
context, the class-sensitive approach is useful in judicial interpretation
and lawmaking in areas as diverse as tax policy, tort reform, contract
25
See generally Lillian R. BeVier, What Ails Us?, 112 YALE L.J. 1135 (2003) (review-
ing BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS:  A NEW PARADIGM FOR
CAMPAIGN FINANCE (2002)) (criticizing a public financing program, proposed by
Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres, for its failure to consider market realities); Bradley A.
Smith, Some Problems With Taxpayer-Funded Political Campaigns, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 591,
610-16 (1999) (encouraging acceptance of monetary inequality as a natural phenome-
non that leads to no political inequality).
26
Cf. Smith, supra note 1, at 1056 (“For most voters, familiarizing themselves with
the candidates and voting in elections have always been the extent of their political
involvement.  Thus, for over 200 years, candidates have relied on a small base of do-
nors who hoped to benefit directly from their preferred candidates’ elections, whether
through a public appointment or a higher tariff.”).
Although class-blind advocates reject the use of law to address distributional con-
cerns, some would employ law to correct rent-seeking market imperfections that are
unrelated to disparities in the distribution of wealth, such as bribery and quid pro quo
corruption.  Cf. Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1986)
(describing the purposes of the law under law and economics as “provid[ing] the con-
ditions necessary for effective bargaining [through] demarcating property rights, as-
suring bargains are enforced, [etc.]” and then functioning “only when bargaining
breaks down or is not possible”).
27
Cf. State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971) (“Property rights serve human
values.  They are recognized to that end, and are limited by it.”); Dalia Tsuk, Corpora-
tions Without Labor:  The Politics of Progressive Corporate Law, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1861,
1882-1909 (2003) (discussing different attempts throughout the twentieth century to
use corporate law to balance private interests and social welfare in a class-sensitive
manner).
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interpretation, consumer protection, trusts and estates, class action
procedure, education, health care, housing, and race relations.28
Although the drafters of BCRA aimed to prevent the corruption
of politics rather than to correct disparities in wealth, the Supreme
Court in McConnell acknowledged disparities in resources in its rea-
soning upholding the statute.  Describing McConnell as the height of
class-sensitive theory in the campaign finance context would be an
overstatement.  Nevertheless, certain passages in the opinion illustrate
the Court’s rejection of the class-blind approach found in Buckley.
For example, the Court employed a participatory self-government
rationale in upholding the ban on unlimited soft money contribu-
tions,29 effectively suggesting that large contributions from a narrow
group of wealthy donors threaten democratic participation by less
wealthy citizens.
The Court noted that justifications for campaign restrictions were
not limited to preventing quid pro quo corruption, but also included
preventing “undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment and the
appearance of such influence.”30  A real danger exists that officehold-
ers will decide issues based not on the “merits” or the “desires of their
constituencies,” “but according to the wishes of those who have made
large financial contributions valued by the officeholder.”31  The Court
28
See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 222 (1997) (suggesting that
Congress could consider the wealth disparity between a media giant and a small inde-
pendent broadcast station in enacting legislation to curb anticompetitive conduct);
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 314 (1984) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (identifying class-sensitive applications of the First Amendment).  But see In re
Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 221 F.3d 449, 468 (3d Cir. 2000) (dismissing wealth dispar-
ity as a significant factor in distributing the costs of litigation); Williams v. Page, 309 F.
Supp. 814, 816 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (“[O]nly when the most fundamental rights are im-
pinged upon will the court overturn an otherwise reasonable and equitable procedure
which because of the disparity of wealth works a hardship on the poor.”).
29
See Richard L. Hasen, Buckley is Dead, Long Live Buckley:  The New Campaign Fi-
nance Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31,
33 (2004) (describing the reasoning suggested by McConnell and explicitly articulated
by Justice Breyer in other contexts as a “participatory self-government rationale.”).
30
McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 664 (2003) (“More importantly, plaintiffs
conceive of corruption too narrowly.  Our cases have firmly established that Congress’
legitimate interest extends beyond preventing simple cash-for-votes corruption to curb-
ing ‘undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of such in-
fluence.’” (quoting FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm’n, 533 U.S. 431,
441 (2001))).
31
Id. at 666.  Indeed, the Court expressed concerns about aggregations of wealth
in the first line of the McConnell opinion, recalling that more than a century earlier re-
formers proposed legislation to prevent corporations from using their wealth to elect
officials who would support the corporation’s self interest “as against [the interests] of
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found that contribution limits “require candidates and political com-
mittees to raise funds from a greater number of persons” and “tangi-
bly benefit public participation in political debate.”32  The aim of this
participatory self-government objective, elaborated by Justice Breyer
in an earlier writing, is “to democratize the influence that money can
bring to bear upon the electoral process, thereby building public con-
fidence in that process, broadening the base of a candidate’s mean-
ingful support, and encouraging greater public participation.”33
The Court in McConnell also acknowledged the impact that con-
centrated wealth can have by upholding the restrictions regarding
corporate spending on advertisements that refer to a federal candi-
date and are broadcast just before an election.34  The Court quoted
the public.”  Id. at 644 (quoting United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567,
571 (1957) (quoting E. ROOT, ADDRESSES ON GOVERNMENT AND CITIZENSHIP 143
(Robert Bacon & James Brown Scott eds. 1916))).
32
Id. at 656.  The Court also recognized that disparities in wealth may suppress
widespread participation in explaining that preventing “the appearance of corruption”
is a rationale for upholding campaign restrictions.  See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC,
528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000) (stating that preventing the appearance of corruption was
important because “the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeop-
ardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance”).
33
Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 253 (2002);
see also Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 401 (Breyer, J., concurring) (writing that campaign
finance restrictions seek to “build public confidence in [the electoral] process and
broaden the base of a candidate’s meaningful financial support, encouraging the pub-
lic participation and open discussion that the First Amendment itself presupposes”
(citing ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 24–27 (1948))).  Perhaps the Court in McConnell did not elaborate on
the participatory self-government rationale because one or two of the Justices are un-
prepared to explicitly embrace the rationale.  See Hasen, supra note 29, at 32 (asserting
that the Court “has continued to entertain the fiction that it is adhering to the anticor-
ruption rationale of Buckley v. Valeo, perhaps because one or two members of the five-
Justice majority making the shift in McConnell may be unwilling (at least now) to ex-
pressly embrace Justice Breyer’s participatory self-government rationale” (footnote
omitted)); Spencer Overton, Restraint and Responsibility:  Judicial Review of Campaign Re-
form, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 663, 684 (2004) (suggesting that perhaps the reasoning
behind the Court’s opinion in McConnell was sparse because the Justices in the majority
agreed that specific provisions of BCRA should be upheld but “did not want to high-
light the divisions in their reasoning”).  See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theo-
rized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1737 (1995) (“When the convergence on par-
ticular outcomes is incompletely theorized, it is because the relevant actors are clear
on the result without being clear, either in their own minds or on paper, on the most
general theory that accounts for it.”).
34
The Act prohibits corporations and unions from spending money from their
general treasuries on electioneering communications.  See BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155,
sec. 203, § 316(b)(2), 116 Stat. 81, 91-92 (2002).  The statute constructively defines
“electioneering communications” to consist of (1) any television, radio, cable, or satel-
lite broadcast, (2) that refers to a clearly identified candidate for federal office, (3) run
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language from Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce explaining that
corporate spending restrictions are necessary due to “the corrosive
and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are ac-
cumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or
no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political
ideas.”35  In Austin, the Court reasoned that special, state-created ad-
vantages, such as perpetual life and favorable treatment in accumulat-
ing and distributing assets, permit corporations to use “‘resources
amassed in the economic marketplace’” to obtain an “‘unfair advan-
tage in the political marketplace.’”36
By stating that contribution limits enhance widespread participa-
tion and by embracing Austin’s language, the Court in McConnell re-
jected the leading class-blind rationale that political money is speech.
Whereas it is not “undue” for people to speak as much as they desire,
aggregations of wealth can unfairly influence the political process.37  The
danger is not the content of any speech or even the amount of speech
produced, but instead the use of aggregations of wealth to gain politi-
cal advantage or access.  Influence that stems from large aggregations
of wealth may be deemed “undue,” such a rationale suggests, because
most citizens do not have access to those massive quantities of wealth.
Victors in economic markets need not enjoy unlimited advantages in
within 60 days before a general election or 30 days before a primary election, and
(4) that can be received by at least 50,000 people in the district that the federal candi-
date seeks to represent.  See id. sec. 201, § 304, 116 Stat. at 89-90.
35
McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 695-96 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce,
494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)).
36
Austin, 494 U.S. at 658-59 (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S.
238, 257 (1986)); see also FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 153 (2003) (quoting Austin,
494 U.S. at 658-59).  In a precursor to Austin, the Court stated that restrictions on
business corporations reflect concern not simply about “use of the corporate form per
se, but about the potential for unfair deployment of wealth for political purposes.”
Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. at 259.
37
In upholding spending restrictions on corporations, the Austin opinion focused
on the special state-created advantages given to corporations in accumulating wealth.
Austin, 494 U.S. at 659 (“These state-created advantages not only allow corporations to
play a dominant role in the Nation’s economy, but also permit them to use ‘resources
amassed in the economic marketplace’ to obtain ‘an unfair advantage in the political
marketplace.’” (quoting Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 257 (1986)).  McConnell em-
ployed the same rationale to uphold restrictions on corporate electioneering spending
and expanded the rationale to uphold restrictions on union electioneering spending.
Although one could assert that many individuals enjoy state-created advantages in ac-
cumulating wealth, the important lesson of McConnell is not that the case allows for
spending restrictions on all individuals and entities.  Rather, the case illustrates the
Court’s acknowledgment of the relationship between disparities in resources and
democratic participation.
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the political sphere.  Congress may embrace democratic norms that it
base its actions not on the dictates of the donor class, but on the mer-
its and the desires of most Americans.38
One should not overstate the holding of McConnell.  The opinion
does not explicitly sanction very low contribution limits, limits on
spending by individuals and candidates, or limits on financial support
of ballot initiatives.  At the same time, however, the Court’s holding
acknowledges that massive disparities in wealth interfere with wide-
spread democratic participation, thereby deflating the class-blind po-
litical rhetoric that money is speech.  As a result, McConnell has the po-
tential to shift the terms of the campaign reform debate toward a core
problem:  disparities in political participation caused by massive dis-
parities in the distribution of wealth.
II.  CLASS-BLIND ANTIREFORMERS OVERLOOK DISTINCT
DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND OBJECTIVES
This Part builds on McConnell’s acknowledgment of disparities in
wealth and challenges antireformers’ justifications for largely disre-
garding such issues.  The antireformers assert that money has little
impact on political outcomes, that the fluid American economy gives
all a fair opportunity to acquire resources, and that money is no dif-
ferent from other political tools like speaking ability or personal mag-
netism.  This Part addresses these claims and concludes that the im-
pact the distribution of financial resources has on political
participation warrants concern.
38
Although class-blind advocates are often antireformers, the class-sensitive ap-
proach does not always favor regulation.  In FEC v. National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S.
480 (1985), the Court struck down a provision that limited PAC spending in support of
presidential candidates who accept public financing.  In striking the restriction, the
Court noted that it was “significant that” about 101,000 people contributed an average
of $75 each to one PAC and about 100,000 contributed an average of $25 each to an-
other PAC.  Id. at 494.  To restrict expenditures that result from pooled resources, ac-
cording to the Court, “would subordinate the voices of those of modest means as op-
posed to those sufficiently wealthy to be able to buy expensive media ads with their
own resources.”  Id. at 495.
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A.  The Impact of Wealth on Those Who Lack Resources
1.  The Importance of Money in Politics39
Antireformers downplay the significance of disparities in wealth by
asserting that money often has little impact on electoral and legislative
outcomes.  Although in 2002 candidates who raised the most money
won 90% of the congressional primary races and 94% of the general
election contests,40 antireformers emphasize that contributors often
give to candidates who are popular among noncontributors and likely
to win.41  According to antireformers, assuming that money influences
outcomes paternalistically implies that voters cannot sift through vari-
ous information to make decisions.42
While the antireformers’ assertion that donors follow voters may
accurately describe some political gifts, the extent to which electoral
and legislative outcomes remain unaffected by money is a contested
empirical question that one cannot answer with mathematical preci-
sion.  For example, how does one establish that most candidates win
elections because of variables unrelated to money?  In addition to
money, relevant variables might include the ideological predisposition
39
See Helen Dewar, For Campaign Reform, a Historically Uphill Fight, WASH. POST,
Oct. 7, 1997, at A5 (“If history is any guide, Mark Hanna, the legendary turn-of-the-
century Republican boss, got it right when it came to the enduring power of money in
American politics.  ‘There are two things that are important in politics,’ Hanna said in
1895.  ‘The first is money and I can’t remember what the second one is.’”).
40
LIOZ & CASSADY, supra note 8, at 14.
41
See Smith, supra note 1, at 1065 (noting that the correlation between winning
elections and spending money is the result of donors giving to candidates likely to win,
not the result of donors’ money buying elections); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money
and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 677 (1997) (“[A] candidate’s ability to
attract funds is at least to some extent an indicator of popularity.  Money may flow di-
rectly in response to the candidate’s ideas or indirectly in response to the candidate’s
popularity with others as reflected in poll numbers and the like.” (footnote omitted)).
The Court has also made similar assumptions.  Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 258
(“Relative availability of funds is after all a rough barometer of public support.”).
42
See Jill E. Fisch, Frankenstein’s Monster Hits the Campaign Trail:  An Approach to
Regulation of Corporate Political Expenditures, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 587, 621-22 (1991)
(“[T]he paternalistic notion that corporate spending should be regulated because
otherwise large corporate spenders would be able to ‘buy’ the political system is unper-
suasive. . . . [T]he tombs of television are filled with the remains of expensive advertis-
ing campaigns that failed.” (footnotes omitted)).  Reformer Dan Ortiz has also ac-
knowledged this phenomenon.  See Daniel R. Ortiz, The Democratic Paradox of Campaign
Finance Reform, 50 STAN. L. REV. 893, 895 (1998) (“[T]he equality-protecting and other
rationales underpinning most forms of campaign finance regulation are premised on
doubts about voters’ civic capabilities.  This is the democratic paradox of campaign
finance reform.”).
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of a candidate’s electorate; the most pressing issues on election day; a
candidate’s ideology, personality, and credibility; a candidate’s cam-
paign strategy and execution of that strategy; the amount and type of
free media a candidate receives; and a host of other factors that evade
quantification.  Similar indeterminate factors prevent measuring the
extent to which money does or does not influence legislative delibera-
tions.43  No static, controlled set of variables exists that allows the isola-
tion and mathematical determination of the electoral or legislative in-
fluence of one causal factor, such as financial contributions.
Although the precise impact of money is unascertainable, the Su-
preme Court in McConnell upheld restrictions based on an extensive
evidentiary record that candidates, parties, and others believe that
money influences electoral outcomes and thus devote extensive time
and energy toward raising it.44  The Court observed that parties “kept
tallies of the amounts of soft money raised by each officeholder, and
‘the amount of money a Member of Congress raise[d] for the national
political committees often affect[ed] the amount the committees
g[a]ve to assist the Member’s campaign.’”45  Parties crafted “menus of
opportunities for access to would-be soft-money donors, with in-
creased prices reflecting an increased level of access.”46  Lobbyists,
CEOs, and wealthy individuals donated substantial sums to parties “for
the express purpose of securing influence over federal officials.”47
Other factors suggest money leads to political success.  Litigants
have sought to invalidate campaign regulation—and courts have
sometimes complied—on the theory that money plays a critical role in
the political process.  For example, the Court in Buckley v. Valeo de-
cided to invalidate spending limits because “virtually every means of
communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure
43
An examination of the influence of money on legislative deliberations, for ex-
ample, might include an analysis of the merits of each bill introduced in a legislative
session, alternative proposals, and the influence of monetary factors relative to non-
monetary factors in the passage of each bill.
44
Cf. E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Faulty Assumptions in “Faulty Assumptions”:  A Response
to Professor Smith’s Critiques of Campaign Finance Reform, 30 CONN. L. REV. 867, 886
(1998) (“Professor Smith’s conception is contradicted by that of a veritable army of
politicians, consultants, and operatives, each of whom behaves as if we were living in a
world where campaign spending can win elections. . . . [C]hanges in candidates’ fa-
vorability ratings undeniably track advertising expenditures, not fundraising num-
bers.”).
45
McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 662 (2003) (alteration in original) (quoting
McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 474-75 (D.D.C. 2003)).
46
Id. at 665.
47
Id. at 662.
88 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 153: 73
of money.” 48  The Court in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC
instructed that contribution limits not be so low as to “drive the sound
of a candidate’s voice below the level of notice . . . .”49  If contributions
were merely a straw poll that reflected popularity, many successful
candidates would probably not spend several hours a day fundrais-
ing.50
While voters make decisions in the voting booth, money often
plays a critical role in the agenda-setting and persuasion that precede
election day.51  Granted, some voters ignore television advertisements
and other tools of political deliberation that campaign money fi-
nances.  But to assume such vehicles have no impact on voter con-
templation denies the importance of the deliberative process.52
Finally, even when contributors give to popular candidates who
are likely to win, money remains important.  While these contributors
48
424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976).
49
528 U.S. 377, 397 (2000).
50
See Richard L. Berke, A Senate Candidate’s Refrain:  ‘Could You Stretch It to $500?,’
N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2002, at A1 (quoting Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee
Executive Director James Jordan, who stated that good candidates “show a lot of disci-
pline and spend six to eight hours a day in their call room raising money . . . .”); see also
PETER LINDSTROM, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, CONGRESSIONAL OPERATIONS:
CONGRESS SPEAKS—A SURVEY OF THE 100TH CONGRESS 92 (1988) (indicating that
29.7% of members of Congress and 47.5% of congressional staffers responding to sur-
vey revealed that the demands of campaign fundraising significantly infringed on the
time devoted to legislative work); Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of
Fund-Raising:  Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (1994) (observing that candidates spend increasing
amounts of time in activities related to fundraising, and that “[a] major goal of cam-
paign finance reform is coming to be—and surely ought to be—to protect the time of
elected representatives and candidates for office”).
51
See RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 198 (2000) (distinguishing between
equality of deliberation, or “influence,” and decision making, and arguing that “equal-
ity of influence is incompatible, even in principle, with other attractive aspects of an
egalitarian society”); Foley, supra note 14, at 1226 (observing that voting is preceded by
the agenda-formation stage “in which matters to be voted upon are identified” and
“the ‘argumentative stage,’ in which competing factions of the electorate attempt to
persuade the mass of undecided voters to agree with their positions”); Andrei Marmor,
Authority, Equality and Democracy 18 (Jan. 2003) (unpublished manuscript, available
at http://lawweb.usc.edu/cleo/working-papers/olin/documents/03_15_paper.pdf)
(asserting that “a principle of equality need not be the same kind of equality with re-
spect to these two main stages of the political process, namely, deliberation and deci-
sion”).
52
Cf. Jim Rutenberg, Campaign Ads Are Under Fire for Inaccuracy, N.Y. TIMES, May
25, 2004, at A21 (“‘Even people who don’t think there is much information in these
ads and say they don’t learn anything from them tell us they believe factoids they could
only have gotten from these ads, and they’re wrong . . . .’” (quoting Brooks Jackson,
director of Factcheck.org, an Annenberg Public Policy Center website)).
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might not enjoy greater influence over the outcome of the election,
they often give their contributions with the hope of purchasing special
access and influence during legislative deliberation.
2.  The Limits of Virtual Representation by the Wealthy
Antireformers also downplay disparities in wealth by arguing that
current contribution patterns do not harm the less wealthy.  Many
wealthy individuals underwrite candidates, causes, and political efforts
that help the less fortunate.53  For example, to a large extent a handful
of wealthy patrons bankrolled Theodore Roosevelt’s 1912 Bull Moose
campaign and Senator Eugene McCarthy’s 1968 antiwar campaign.54
Wealthy donors fund voter registration projects, get-out-the-vote
drives, and other grassroots efforts in poorer communities.55  Along
similar lines, the antireformers argue, the donor class is ideologically
diverse.  Money from wealthy liberals cancels out the money from
wealthy conservatives, and the distributional disparities have little ef-
fect on the content of political debate.56  The tens of millions of dol-
53
See Smith, supra note 1, at 1082 (“Historically, candidates with large constituen-
cies among the poor and the working class have obtained their campaign funds from a
small base of wealthy donors.”).
54
See id. at 1073 (noting that “well-known public figures challenging the status quo
have traditionally relied on a small number of wealthy patrons to fund their cam-
paigns” and citing Roosevelt’s and McCarthy’s campaigns as examples).
55
As Bradley Smith notes:
[I]t is hard to imagine that any but the most extreme advocates of campaign
finance reform really want to reduce the flow of funds for get-out-the-vote and
voter registration drives, or even for yard signs, buttons, bumper stickers and
slate cards—the items for which soft money is specifically authorized by stat-
ute.
Bradley A. Smith, Soft Money, Hard Realities:  The Constitutional Prohibition on a Soft Money
Ban, 24 J. LEGIS. 179, 182 (1998).
56
See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, The Issue of Issue Advocacy:  An Economic, Political, and
Constitutional Analysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1761, 1780 (1999) (acknowledging the possibility
that disparities in wealth have “very little ‘distorting effect’” because “wealthy
individuals (and groups) ‘cancel each other out,’” and citing DEBORAH BECK ET AL.,
ANNENBERG PUB. POL’Y CTR., ISSUE ADVOCACY ADVERTISING DURING THE 1996 CAMPAIGN 3
(1997), showing that “ads generally supportive of Democratic positions and those gen-
erally aligned with Republican positions were evenly split”).  Bradley Smith has also
noted that
corporate PACs, which presumably would be considered a voice of the ‘rich,’
routinely give forty to sixty percent of their contributions to Democratic Party
candidates, despite the general belief that the Republican Party favors those
with high incomes.  That the ‘wealthy’ should be less homogenous than other
political elites is no shock.
Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks:  Speech, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance, 86
GEO. L.J. 45, 94 (1997).
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lars given by liberal billionaire George Soros to 527s—groups covered
by section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code—that run anti-Bush at-
tack ads, the argument goes, offset the tens of thousands of $2000
contributions raised by Republican President George W. Bush.57
Outside of a few anecdotes, however, the antireformers provide
no persuasive evidence that the ideological spending and contribu-
tions of the donor class mirror the political disposition of the public as
a whole.  Indeed, data suggests wealthier contributors are unrepresen-
tative of the greater public.58  Antireformers also provide little empiri-
cal data that wealthier Republicans always perfectly represent the in-
terests of poorer Republicans or that richer Democrats adequately
represent more impoverished Democrats.
Even if the donor class accurately reflected the political spectrum
of people of all financial backgrounds, such “virtual” representation of
non-contributors sacrifices an important value—individual autonomy.
57
In the aftermath of the ban on unlimited soft money contributions to political
parties, a few individuals contributed millions to groups organized under section 527
of the Internal Revenue Code.  These groups spend such money to support or attack
particular candidates, and some reformers have worked to restrict contributions to
such groups.  See Dan Balz & Thomas B. Edsall, Democrats Forming Parallel Campaign:
Interest Groups Draw GOP Fire, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2004, at A1 (“The Democratic 527
organizations have drawn support from some wealthy liberals determined to defeat
Bush.  They include financier George Soros and his wife, Susan Weber, who gave $5
million to ACT and $1.46 million to MoveOn.org . . . .”); see also Donald B. Tobin,
Anonymous Speech and Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, 37 GA. L. REV. 611, 620-36
(2003) (providing a history of section 527 and an explanation of how section 527 or-
ganizations operate).
58
See Oren Levin-Waldman, The Minimum Wage and The Cause of Democracy, 61 REV.
SOC. ECON. 487, 501 (2003) (“As household income rises, individuals are more likely
to vote and their votes are more likely to be in favor of policies less favorable to the
disadvantaged.”), available at 2003 WL 57281735; Louise Witt, Whose Side is God On?,
AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Feb. 2004, at 18, 19 (2004) (“Respondents with less education
and lower household incomes are more likely to say that religion should ‘very much’
play a role in public policy.”); Michael Kranish & Glen Johnson, Full Scope of Decision
Uncertain, BOSTON GLOBE, May 3, 2003, at A1 (indicating that although the country is
split fairly evenly between registered Democratic voters and Republican voters, in the
2002 election cycle the Democratic National Committee received just $67 million in
hard money contributions compared to the Republican National Committee’s $164
million); Wilcox July 3, 2004 Chart, supra note 10 (indicating that 63% of $1000 con-
tributors to presidential candidates during 2000 primaries identify themselves as con-
servative, 13% consider themselves moderate, and 24% consider themselves liberal).
 In addition to providing no evidence connecting wealthy contributor ideology to
that of society as a whole, the antireformers provide no theory as to why this alleged
balance will exist forever into the future.  Further, the antireformers fail to explain why
wealthy contributors sympathetic to the poor will consistently, with regard to each
candidate and each issue, choose ideology over self-interest.
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Individual autonomy involves choice—the “right [of individuals]
to make important decisions defining their own lives for themselves.”59
Autonomy means “having a say in what affects you,” including how
one is governed.60  This choice is an integral part of self-affirmation.
While an individual’s freedom from government interference is per-
haps the most familiar concept of individual autonomy,61 the scope of
a person’s choice does not depend merely upon government action or
inaction.  Other variables—access to resources, the actions of other
non-governmental actors—are relevant as well.  Furthermore, auton-
omy requires the existence of meaningful alternatives from which to
choose.62
By discounting the importance of meaningful participation in de-
termining the viability of candidates, the antireformers compromise
critical autonomy values.  An individual who cannot give large sums
reaps fewer benefits of self-affirmation and is less able to exercise con-
trol over her life and community.
In contrast, the wealthier contributor often uses one tool—
money—to implement his agenda by mobilizing another tool—non-
contributing voters likely to cast a ballot for the contributor’s candi-
date.  This is not to suggest that the wealthy should not spend money
on voter mobilization or that voters predisposed to vote for particular
candidates do not exercise choice in deciding whether to vote or stay
home.  But serving as a target of get-out-the-vote funds is no substitute
for the autonomy enjoyed by wealthier contributors.  Simply control-
ling less wealth does not make one unworthy of the self-determination
59
RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION 222 (1993); see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY
AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 138 (First Free Press Paperback ed. 1995) (noting
that autonomy can be defined as permitting or empowering individuals to be “authors
of the narratives of their own lives”).
60
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term—Foreword:  The Vanishing Con-
stitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 75 (1989) (defining individual autonomy as “the impor-
tance of each individual having a say in how he or she is governed”); see also Michael H.
Shapiro, Introduction:  Judicial Selection and the Design of Clumsy Institutions, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1555, 1567 n.48 (1988) (“‘Autonomy,’ as used in the text, refers to that aspect of
autonomy dealing with opportunities to pursue preferences—an ability generally en-
hanced by having a say in what affects you.”).
61
See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 122-31
(1969) (“I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men
interferes with my activity.  Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within which
a man can act unobstructed by others.”).
62
See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 373-77 (1986) (“All that has to be
accepted is that to be autonomous a person must not only be given a choice but he
must be given an adequate range of choices.”).
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that accompanies political participation through large financial con-
tributions.
In short, the antireformers fail to explain why the lack of wealth is
of lesser consequence to autonomy than other factors that limit an in-
dividual’s ability to support a candidate, such as contribution and
spending restrictions.
B.  Democratic Structure Versus Economic Markets
Antireformers argue that even if money does influence political
outcomes, campaign contributions allow people to convert their hard
work and talents from the economic sphere into attributes in the po-
litical sphere.63  Disparities in wealth are no less fair than inequalities
in other political tools, such as education, celebrity, time to volunteer,
speaking ability, personal magnetism, intelligence, or good looks.64
Unlike these other attributes, money is available to a broad cross sec-
tion of the public and to different individuals at different times due to
the fluidity of the American economy.
The antireformers overstate the fairness and fluidity of market dis-
tribution and fail to acknowledge the distinct values, objectives, and
structure of democracy.
1.  The Limits of Economic Mobility
Professor Bradley Smith claims that in “America’s private markets
wealth and property allocations are constantly changing,” and that
“[m]ost Americans move up and down the income and wealth scale
63
See Smith, supra note 1, at 1080 (“The question is whether people will be al-
lowed to convert their varied talents into political influence.”).
64
See BeVier, supra note 1, at 1118 (“Eliminate the unequal influence of wealth
and every other source of unequal political influence will remain—intelligence, per-
sonal magnetism, celebrity status, organizational skills, communication skills, and so
on.”); Smith, supra note 56, at 89 (“The question, however, becomes why this single
source of unequal political influence should be removed from the process. . . . Why
should access to money be singled out?  What are the characteristics that allegedly
make money a particular vice in our political system?” (footnote omitted)).  Kathleen
Sullivan has noted that
legislators respond disproportionately to the interests of some constituents all
the time, depending, for example, on the degree of their organization, the in-
tensity of their interest in particular issues, and their capacity to mobilize votes
to punish the legislator who does not act in their interests. . . . It is at least
open to question why attempts to achieve the same ends through amassing
campaign money are more suspect, at least in the absence of personal inure-
ment.
Sullivan, supra note 41, at 680.
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over time—many with stunning rapidity.”65  Professor Lillian BeVier,
arguing that the American economy and political power are dynamic,
cites data showing that among taxpayers in the lowest bracket in 1979,
only 14.2% were still there nine years later, and 14.7% had risen all
the way to the highest bracket.66  She writes that “[t]he familiar saying
‘three generations from shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves’ is but a homely
way of capturing the universal flux.”67  Thus, BeVier asserts, “even
though ‘wealth’ at any particular point in time may be correlated with
political power at that point in time, both wealth and power will be
constantly in flux.”68
Professor BeVier’s taxpayer data provides an incomplete picture
of economic mobility in the United States.  The source BeVier cited
acknowledged that the data’s seemingly high economic mobility
stemmed from heavy representation of young adults in the study’s
bottom quintile in 1979.  As one might expect, this group’s earnings
rose as they aged and gained skills.69  Further, every taxpayer in the
study’s pool filed tax returns for nine consecutive years.  Thus, the
study does not accurately reflect the mobility of poorer Americans,
who often do not earn enough to file tax returns.70
Professor BeVier’s intragenerational taxpayer study also fails to
capture the impact of children’s class origins on economic mobility
later in life.71  Whereas a son born into the top decile of income has a
65
Smith, supra note 56, at 68.
66
See BeVier, supra note 56, at 1778-79 (quoting David R. Henderson, The Rich—
and Poor—Are Getting Richer, RED HERRING, Aug. 1997, at 120, 120, reprinted in HOOVER
DIG., 1998 No. 1, at 17, 18-19 (“[O]f the taxpayers in the bottom quintile in 1979, only
14.2 percent (or one in seven) were still there in 1988.  Meanwhile, 20.7 percent had
moved to the next higher fifth, 25 percent to the middle fifth, 25.3 percent to the sec-
ond-highest fifth, and 14.7 percent to the highest fifth.”)).
67
Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform:  Specious Arguments, Intractable Dilem-
mas, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1258, 1264 (1994).
68
BeVier, supra note 56, at 1779.
69
See Henderson, supra note 66, at 18-19 (“The most important factor [in mobil-
ity] is age.  Heavily represented in the bottom quintile are young people, who have just
graduated from high school or college and are living on their own.  Their current
earnings are low, but as they age and gain skills, their earnings rise.”).
70
See JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE STUDY, INCOME MOBILITY AND ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITY (June 1992) (acknowledging that the study does not provide a complete
picture of income mobility of poorer Americans who sometimes do not earn enough
to file tax returns), available at http://www.house.gov/jec/middle/mobility/mobility.
htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2004).  The study was based upon 14,351 taxpayers who filed
tax returns in every year from 1979 through 1988.  Id.
71
See DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW:  CASES AND
MATERIALS 743-44 (2d ed. 2001) (“BeVier provides no empirical support for her claim
about redistribution of wealth across generations, and it turns out that long-term longi-
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40.7% chance of attaining the top quintile as an adult, a son from the
poorest decile has only a 3.7% chance of making it to the top quin-
tile.72  A 2002 study suggests that the United States leads only two of
the seven advanced nations examined—South Africa and England—in
intergenerational earnings mobility.73  Economic and sociological
studies of American intergenerational mobility confirm that “children
of disadvantaged class origins have to display far more merit than do
children of more advantaged origins in order to attain similar class
positions.”74
Professor BeVier’s focus on the income of taxpayers also overlooks
the important role of wealth in measuring class mobility.  Wealth con-
siders access to resources in the context of financial obligations such
as debt.75  Wealth may be even more relevant to one’s ability to give
large financial contributions than income is.  As two scholars noted in
highlighting the significance of wealth:
tudinal empirical studies (studying the same people or families over time) may not ex-
ist.  In the shorter term, the empirical picture does not support BeVier.”).
72
Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, The Inheritance of Inequality, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Summer 2002, at 3, 5.  Economic studies going back to the mid-1960s found a low cor-
relation between parents’ and sons’ incomes.  See generally PETER M. BLAU & OTIS
DUDLEY DUNCAN, THE AMERICAN OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE 26-38 (1967) (showing
intragenerational mobility rates based on a father’s occupation).  But the veracity of
those results has not held over time.  Recent research has revealed that early conclu-
sions showing little correlation between generational earning patterns were based on
faulty measurements.  First, individuals’ mistakes in recalling the income of their par-
ents led to inaccurate information.  Second, the early studies’ reliance on single-
year or even three-year income samples often reflected temporary increases and de-
pressions in income that misrepresented individuals’ longer-term income averages.  See
Bowles & Gintis, supra, at 4 (discussing “mistakes in reporting income, particularly
when individuals were asked to recall the income of their parents, and transitory com-
ponents in current income uncorrelated with underlying permanent income”).
73
See THE CENTURY FOUNDATION, RAGS TO RICHES:  THE AMERICAN DREAM IS LESS
COMMON IN THE UNITED STATES THAN ELSEWHERE 7 & fig.4, 8 (2004) (suggesting that
citizens of Finland are followed by Swedes, Canadians, Germans, Americans, South Af-
ricans, and the British in intergenerational earnings mobility, but noting that the re-
sults are inconclusive because of differences in data sources and methods (citing Gary
Solon, Cross-Country Differences in Intergenerational Earnings Mobility, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Summer 2002, at 59, 62 tbl.1)), available at http://www.tcf.org/Publications/
EconomicsInequality/ragrichrc.pdf.
74
Richard Breen and John H. Goldthorpe, Class Inequality and Meritocracy:  A Cri-
tique of Saunders and an Alternative Analysis, 50 BRIT. J. SOC. 1, 21 (1999).
75
See MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE
WEALTH:  A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 30 (1997) (“Wealth is the total
extent, at a given moment, of an individual’s accumulated assets and access to re-
sources, and it refers to the net value of assets . . . less debt held at one time.”).
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[T]he reality for most families is that income supplies the necessities of
life, while wealth represents a kind of “surplus” resource available for
improving life chances, providing further opportunities, securing pres-
tige, passing status along to one’s family, and influencing the political
process.
76
Economic mobility is even more dismal in terms of wealth.  One
study of disposable wealth revealed that only 1.4% of families in the
lowest quintile had ascended to the highest quintile fifteen years
later.77  Most of the change that does occur is insignificant.  Of Ameri-
can households in the bottom fifth in net worth in 1984, five years
later 90.1% were still in the bottom two-fifths and only 3.3% had risen
to the top two-fifths.78  Of those in the top fifth in net worth in 1984,
five years later 92.8% were in the top two-fifths and only 1.5% had
fallen to the bottom two-fifths.79
Further, while differences in hard work and talent among indi-
viduals sometimes cause disparities in wealth,80 the antireformers give
inadequate attention to structural factors such as upbringing, sexism,
and racism that also cause disparities.81  The government-sponsored
racial covenants of a few decades ago, for example, continue to shape
76
Id. at 32 (emphasis added).  While studies have not engaged in detailed analyses
of whether income or wealth has the greater impact on the likelihood that an individ-
ual will make political contributions, some commentators suggest that, in certain situa-
tions, wealth has a greater impact on charitable contributions.  See, e.g., Martin Feld-
stein, The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions, Part I—Aggregate and Distributional
Effects, 28 NAT’L TAX J. 81, 90 (1975) (“At . . . very high income levels, adjusted gross
income is a less adequate measure of economic income and wealth is a more impor-
tant influence on giving.”).
77
See Nancy A. Jianakoplos & Paul L. Menchik, Wealth Mobility, 79 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 18, 20 (referring to the number of households that ascended from the lowest
wealth quintile (less than $5473) to the highest (more than $99,188) between 1966
and 1981).
78
See Díaz-Giménez et al., supra note 13, at 14 tbl.7 (comparing differences in
wealth holdings in 1984 and 1989).
79
Id.
80
We can also assume, for the sake of argument, that these characteristics do not
stem from structural environmental influences beyond the control of the individual.
Cf. Rosenkranz, supra note 44, at 894 (“‘[P]ersuasive’ powers rest on a different plane
than monetary power.  The power of persuasion, which involves skills ‘such as writing
[and] speaking,’ goes to the heart of what the First Amendment is about in a way that
the power of the purse does not.” (alteration in original)).
81
Cf. Kenneth Arrow, What Has Economics to Say About Racial Discrimination?, J.
ECON. PERSP., Spring 1998, at 91, 98 (“Models of racial discrimination in which all ra-
cial attitudes are expressed through the market will get at only part of the story.  At
each stage, direct social transactions unmediated by a market play a role.  Even the
market manifestations will be altered by these direct social influences.”).
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housing values, the quality of public education, and other vehicles
that allow individuals to acquire wealth.82
These structural factors also influence the fluidity of income and
wealth among particular racial groups.83  In a study of men who
turned twenty-one after 1980, 47% of whites reached middle class
earnings by age thirty, whereas only 19% of blacks had done so.84  Af-
rican Americans are nearly five times more likely than whites to fall
from the top income quartile to the bottom quartile, while African
Americans born to the bottom quartile attain the top quartile at less
than one-half the rate of whites.85  In a study of American wealth mo-
bility over 15 years, 0% of the African American males in the study
rose from the lowest wealth decile to the highest.86
82
See Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race:  Political Geography in Legal
Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1843, 1848 (1994) (describing “the responsibility of federal
policy for the persuasiveness of racially restrictive covenants,” resulting in “significant
disinvestment in black areas by private institutions” (internal quotation marks and
footnote omitted)); cf. RAYMOND S. FRANKLIN, SHADOWS OF RACE AND CLASS 124-25
(1991) (noting that homes owned by middle-class African Americans “do not appreci-
ate as rapidly in value over time as homes owned by whites”); OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra
note 75, at 40, 150 (observing that “similar housing investments made by whites and
blacks yield vastly divergent returns—to the distinct disadvantage of blacks”).
83
Cf. Spencer Overton, But Some Are More Equal:  Race, Exclusion, and Campaign Fi-
nance, 80 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1014-15 (2002) (“[S]peech markets created in the cam-
paign finance context are not ‘neutral’ or ‘fair,’ but are based on existing property al-
locations that have been shaped by illegitimate factors such as past discriminatory
public policies.”).
84
Mobility in America: Up, Down and Standing Still, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 24, 1996,
at 30.  According to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), entering the middle
class is getting harder.  A study found that the mean and median family net worth for
whites as $291,800 and $95,000 respectively, but only $59,100 and $7500 for blacks.
Both gaps have grown larger, not smaller, over time.  Elena Gouskova & Frank Staf-
ford, Trends in Household Wealth Dynamics, 1999-2001, at 2, 6-7 tbls.2, 3 (2002), available
at http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/Publications/Papers/TrendsIndynamics19992001.
pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2004).
85
As one study found:
Downward mobility from the top quartile to the bottom quartile is nearly five
times as great for blacks as for whites.  Thus, whatever it is that accounts for
their success, successful blacks do not transmit it to their children as effec-
tively as do successful whites.  Correspondingly, blacks born to the bottom
quartile attain the top quartile at one half the rate of whites.
Bowles & Gintis, supra note 72, at 7; see also Thomas Hertz, Rags, Riches and Race:  The
Intergenerational Economic Mobility of Black and White Families in the United States (Apr. 9,
2003) (“While only 17% of whites born to the bottom decile of family income re-
mained there as adults, for blacks the figure was 42%.”), available at http://
academic2.american.edu/~hertz/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2004).
86
See Jianakoplos & Menchik, supra note 77, at 18, 20, 28 (measuring American
wealth in 1966 and 1981).
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In short, while some economic mobility exists in the United States,
markets are not so fair and fluid as to extinguish concerns about the
impact of wealth on democratic participation.
2.  The Distinctions Between Money and Other Political Tools
Despite the antireformers’ attempts to characterize money as a
democratizing tool that reformers selectively demonize, money differs
from characteristics like celebrity, time to volunteer, speaking ability,
personal magnetism, and good looks.87
These political tools are randomly distributed throughout society
in a way that wealth is not.  As examined above, wealth is concentrated
among certain groups and neighborhoods and remains so for genera-
tions, due in part to illegitimate factors like past racial discrimina-
tion.88  To the extent that democracy should reflect and respond to the
needs of society as a whole, individuals within different neighbor-
hoods and ethnic, ideological, political, and economic groups should
have access to important tools of political participation.89
Further, tools like speaking skills, personal magnetism, and good
looks are more personal to individuals and less fungible than money.90
87
Counter to the claims listed by the antireformers, those who are sensitive to
class are concerned about disparities in political attributes other than money.  For ex-
ample, education facilitates democratic participation, and the undereducation of sev-
eral populations poses a democratic problem.
88 See supra Part II.B.1.
89
There is also a question as to whether disparities in media ownership should
prompt concerns about distribution.  See Foley, supra note 14, at 1252 (“The owners of
newspapers should have no greater opportunity, simply by virtue of owning this prop-
erty, than any other citizen to attempt to persuade undecided voters how to vote on
election day.”); Richard L. Hasen, Campaign Finance Laws and the Rupert Murdoch Prob-
lem, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1665 (1999) (“[I]t seems anomalous to exempt Rupert
Murdoch, defense contractors, Mickey Mouse and a host of other characters [from re-
strictions] simply because they used their wealth to buy a newspaper or broadcast sta-
tion.”); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Speech About Political Candidates:  The Unin-
tended Consequences of Three Proposals, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 58 (2000) (arguing
that “under [the money as property] approach, the government would acquire broad
power to control newspapers . . . and anyone else who hires others to participate in
creating a speech product”).  Simply because the media context raises questions of dis-
tribution, however, does not mean that questions of distribution in the campaign fi-
nance context are irrelevant.  Indeed, the proposal advanced in Part III, infra, uses
technology, tax credits, and matching funds to enhance the importance of smaller
contributions not only relative to large contributors, but also relative to owners of me-
dia outlets and those who possess political talents such as celebrity, time to volunteer,
speaking ability, personal magnetism, and good looks.
90
Cf. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1885
(1987) (“In our understanding of personhood we are committed to an ideal of indi-
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While money is universally quantifiable,91 the other political tools gen-
erally defy objective measurement.  Perhaps due to the easy quantifi-
cation of money, legislatures routinely tax, redistribute, and restrict
the use of financial resources, but regulation to offset one’s speaking
skills, magnetism, or good looks represents a greater infringement on
personal autonomy.92
Money is also unique because of the critical role of the political
process in shaping wealth distribution.  Politicians do not generally over-
see rules regarding the distribution of celebrity, time to volunteer,
speaking skills, personal magnetism, and good looks, but they do write
the tax code, determine government spending, and regulate com-
merce.  Unlike other political tools, wealth can drive government de-
cisions that will increase or preserve the very political tool used—the
wealth—and further entrench the political power of the holder.93
Perhaps most important, money differs from other political tools
because economic markets represent a primary sphere of power in
our society, and legitimate questions exist as to whether political in-
fluence should be another commodified fringe benefit of success in
the economic sphere.  To the extent one values diversity in concentra-
tions of power, the democratic sphere should be as independent as
possible from concentrated power in the economic sphere.
3.  The Limits of Wealth Maximization
While some might dismiss concerns about fairness in the distribu-
tion of wealth as irrelevant to the singular goal of wealth maximiza-
tion,94 such an approach is unwarranted in the political sphere due to
vidual uniqueness that does not cohere with the idea that each person’s attributes are
fungible, that they have a monetary equivalent, and that they can be traded off against
those of other people.”).
91
Cf. ALEXANDER HEARD, THE COSTS OF DEMOCRACY 90 (1960) (explaining that
money “is a universal, transferable unit infinitely more flexible in its uses than the
time, or ideas, or talent, or influence, or controlled votes that also constitute contribu-
tions to politics”).
92
Cf. Spencer Overton, Mistaken Identity:  Unveiling the Property Characteristics of Po-
litical Money, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1235, 1262 (2000) (“While the amorphous nature of
speech is likely to lead to arbitrary appraisals of speech, government can respond to
issues of scarcity and distribution exhibited by political money with some semblance of
objectivity due, in part, to the quantifiability of the interest.”).
93
Cf. Foley, supra note 14, at 1204 (“An important function of electoral politics is
to determine how wealth should be distributed among society’s members.  The existing
distribution of wealth at the time of any particular election should not affect the elec-
torate’s determination of what the distribution should be henceforth.”).
94
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 460-61 (4th ed. 1992) (ex-
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the broader objectives of democracy.  A central function of democratic
power is to defend important values and human needs that “rational”
markets sometimes ignore.95  Such values include, but are not limited
to, inclusion, fairness, and opportunity.96
The mathematical precision of an economic model is seductive,
perhaps because such an approach avoids the complex balancing and
the unpredictable outcomes that often characterize democratic com-
promises.  An economic analysis misses important variables, however.
For example, in arguing that market incentives are better limitations
on corporate spending than are government restrictions, antireformer
Professor Jill Fisch writes:
[A]s a matter of social utility, the economic marketplace operates as a far
more efficient limitation on corporate political speech than do cam-
paign finance laws.  If a corporation wastes a large amount of money on
political speech, it will hinder its ability to compete in the traditional
business markets and in the stock market.  The cost to the corporation
of making political expenditures must be justified in terms of overall
economic benefit; that is, expenditures should result in lower prices and
higher profits—socially optimal results.
97
While Professor Fisch’s work, as a whole, emphasizes voter choice
and discounts corporate spending as a causal factor in political out-
comes,98 such a utilitarian analysis is limited.  Even assuming a corpo-
ration makes a political expenditure and profits from the election of a
particular candidate—imagine that the candidate is pro-growth and
skeptical of most environmental regulations—we do not know that
these results are socially optimal.  Externalities resulting from relaxed
plaining that redistribution of wealth does not increase the overall wealth of society).
95
See Fiss, supra note 26, at 7 (“The role of the law is neither to perfect nor to rep-
licate the market, but rather to make those judgments that the adherents of law and
economics claim are only ‘arbitrary,’ i.e., a mere matter of distribution.”); cf. ROBERT
KUTTNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE:  THE VIRTUES AND LIMITS OF MARKETS 4 (University
of Chicago Press 1999) (1996) (“Even in a capitalist economy, the marketplace is only
one of several means by which society makes decisions, determines worth, allocates re-
sources, maintains a social fabric, and conducts human relations.”); Radin, supra note
90, at 1851 (“[T]he characteristic rhetoric of economic analysis is morally wrong when
it is put forward as the sole discourse of human life.”).
96
See Jean Braucher, Defining Unfairness:  Empathy and Economic Analysis at the Fed-
eral Trade Commission, 68 B.U. L. REV. 349, 351 (1988) (“Usually efficiency and fairness,
in the sense of (rough) equality in the distribution of resources, are considered com-
peting values which require a tradeoff to reconcile capitalism and democracy.” (citing
ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY:  THE BIG TRADEOFF 1-5 (1975))).
97
Fisch, supra note 42, at 621.
98
See supra Part II.A.1 for a response to the claim that money is relatively unim-
portant in politics.
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environmental regulations might cause greater harm to residential
neighbors than the value of the benefit to the corporation.  Disparities
in wealth might have left the residents unable to afford their own ad-
vertisement urging voters to support a candidate who favors environ-
mental regulation.  Even assuming that the corporation’s enhanced
productivity outweighs the harm to the neighbors, this says nothing
about whether the neighbors are better equipped to bear the costs of
looser regulation, or about the fairness of the neighbors bearing the
cost.  More important, democracy should allow for consideration of
certain issues that may transcend markets, such as concerns about
preventing increases in cancer rates or miscarriages among residents
in the neighborhood.
Further, because many individuals do not work to maximize per-
sonal wealth to the exclusion of all other values, factors other than
economic gain inspire talented people to work hard.  A law school
valedictorian’s sense of commitment to a broader community, for ex-
ample, might lead her to accept a position at a low-paying public
interest organization.  The antireformers fail to explain why people
whose talents and hard work are not rewarded by economic markets
should have less access to influence in the political sphere.
Although many wealthy individuals make significant contributions
to society, the antireformers do not adequately articulate the rationale
for extending special benefits in the democratic context to those with
financial resources.  Lillian BeVier notes that “since the wealthiest
taxpayers—those in the top 10% of income brackets—pay 59.1% of all
federal income taxes,” they have an understandable interest in a po-
litical process that will determine “how their taxed dollars will be
spent.”99  This observation, however, does not explain why other
Americans who have a great deal at stake, such as a single mother
whose children attend public school or a soldier deployed to fight in
Iraq, should enjoy less opportunity to participate in political delibera-
tion.
4.  The Unique Role of Widespread Participation in Democracy
The antireformers also minimize the critical role of meaningful,
widespread participation in establishing democratic legitimacy.  Some
commentators might argue that an allocation of wealth in which the
wealthiest 20% control 80% of the resources is the price to be paid
99
BeVier, supra note 56, at 1780.
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for well-functioning economic markets that provide adequate incen-
tives for hard work and innovation.  But with regard to democratic ex-
change and governance, the need for commitment from a diverse,
broad base of perspectives suggests that dominance by a homogen-
eous donor class representing less than 2% of the voting-age popula-
tion is problematic.
Scholars have defined citizen participation as “purposeful activi-
ties in which citizens take part in relation to government.”100  Partici-
pation is a crucial democratic value.  As Justice Brandeis remarked,
“the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people.”101  Participation
includes but is not limited to voting;102 involvement with or financial
support of a campaign, political party, issue, or interest group; and
public advocacy and protest.103
Widespread participation serves four primary functions.  First, it
exposes decision makers to a variety of ideas and viewpoints, which
ensures fully informed decisions.104  Second, it enhances the legiti-
macy of government decisions, which increases the likelihood that
citizens will voluntarily comply with such decisions.105  Third, wide-
100
Stuart Langton, What is Citizen Participation?, in CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN
AMERICA 13, 17 (Stuart Langton ed., 1978) (emphasis omitted).  For a general discus-
sion of the role of citizen participation in a democracy, see PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS:
NOMOS XVI (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1975); CAROLE PATEMAN,
PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1970); THE CASE FOR PARTICIPATORY
DEMOCRACY:  SOME PROSPECTS FOR A RADICAL SOCIETY (C. George Benello & Dimitrios
Roussopoulos eds., 1971).
101
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
102
See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29,
31 (1985) (asserting that the early Republican conception of political participation in-
cluded deliberative dialogue and debate, and was not limited to the act of voting). But
see John H. Aldrich, Rational Choice and Turnout, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 246, 246 (1993)
(“Turning out to vote is the most common and important act of political participation
in any democracy.”).
103
See JAMES BURKHART ET AL., STRATEGIES FOR POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 57-100
(1972) (providing examples of participation); MARY GRISEZ KWEIT & ROBERT W. KWEIT,
IMPLEMENTING CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN A BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY:  A CONTINGENCY
APPROACH 54-56 (1981) (same); Langton, supra note 100, at 21 (same).
104
See Walter A. Rosenbaum, Public Involvement as Reform and Ritual:  The Develop-
ment of Federal Participation Programs, in CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA 81, 86
(Stuart Langton ed., 1978) (noting that commentators have asserted that “the public
interest is most likely to emerge from the interplay and conflict between a multitude of
interests”); Nancy Perkins Spyke, Public Participation in Environmental Decisionmaking at
the New Millennium:  Structuring New Spheres of Public Influence, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 263, 267 (1999) (“Widespread participation exposes decisionmakers to a healthy
mix of perspectives, which is believed to improve the decisionmaking process.” (foot-
notes omitted)).
105
Cf. KWEIT & KWEIT, supra note 103, at 129 (noting that citizen participation is
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spread participation allows government resources to be redistributed
and priorities altered to reflect evolving problems and needs.106
Fourth, participation furthers the self-fulfillment and self-definition of
individual citizens who play a role in shaping the decisions that affect
their lives.107
When less than 2% of voting-age Americans dominate a crucial
element of political participation like funding campaigns, a narrow set
of ideas and viewpoints obstruct fully-informed decision making.  This
is especially true in light of the special access many donors enjoy at
fundraising events and the homogeneity of the donor class:  70.2% are
male, 70.6% are age 50 or older, 84.3% have a college degree, 85.7%
have family incomes of $100,000 or more,108 and 95.8% are white.109
expected to increase positive attitudes among participants and discussing conflicting
empirical evidence on the subject); cf. Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Emptiness of Majority
Rule, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 195, 201 (1996) (“To deserve the democratic denomination,
the people must take part in political affairs.”).
106
See KWEIT & KWEIT, supra note 103, at 162 (asserting that the goals of public
participation include the redistribution of power).
107
See Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argu-
ment:  Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REV. 443, 451 (1989) (discussing a “constitutive” vision
of politics whereby citizens define themselves through their participation); see also C.B.
MACPHERSON, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 47-48, 51-52 (1977) (assert-
ing that public participation increases “the amount of personal self-development of all
the members of the society”).
108
See Wilcox July 3, 2004 Chart, supra note 10 (indicating that of those who made
contributions over $200 to presidential primary candidates in the 2000 election cycle,
29.8% were female, 29.4% were younger than age fifty, 15.7% had not acquired a col-
lege degree, and 14.3% had family incomes under $100,000).  These numbers differ
from the U.S. population as a whole in 2000:  50.9% were female, 72.7% were younger
than age 50, 75.6% of individuals age twenty-five and older had not acquired a college
degree, and 86.6% of the U.S. population had family incomes under $100,000.  These
data are taken from the U.S. Census Bureau.  See DENISE I. SMITH & RENEE E.
SPRAGGINS, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, GENDER:  2000, at 1 (Sept. 2001) (showing
gender data), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-9.pdf;
JULIE MEYER, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, AGE:  2000, at 4 (Oct. 2001) (showing age
data), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-12.pdf; KURT J.
BAUMAN & NIKKI L. GRAF, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT:
2000, at 3 (Aug. 2001) (showing educational attainment data), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-24.pdf; CARMEN DE NAVAS-WALT ET
AL., U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MONEY INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES:  2000, at 17
(Sept. 2001) (showing income data), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2001pubs/p60-213.pdf.
109
See E-mail from Clyde Wilcox, Professor of Government, Georgetown Univer-
sity, to Spencer Overton, Associate Professor of Law, The George Washington Univer-
sity Law School (June 10, 2004, 11:07:40 EST) (on file with author) (indicating that of
donors who contributed more than $200 who replied to a racial identity question,
95.8% identified themselves as white, 1.5% Hispanic, 1.5% African American, and
0.7% Asian; about 0.5% identified themselves as “other”).  By comparison, in the 2000
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To the extent that vast disparities exist in the instrumentalities of
participation, citizens feel less able to shape the decisions that affect
their lives and question the legitimacy of the laws.110  Granted, some
who cannot contribute, tamed by unbounded economic market
rhetoric, may submit to the implication that they lack entitlement to a
primary avenue of political participation enjoyed by large contribu-
tors.111  For others, however, such exclusion may tap into a reservoir of
suspicion that they do not count as full citizens within the political
community and thus possess inadequate control over their own lives.
The indifference of antireformers who either rationalize or idly toler-
ate such exclusion only compounds the anger, resentment, and frus-
tration felt by those who are excluded.
Although any process of government distribution is inherently
subjective and contestable, the lack of widespread participation in
campaign financing raises questions about the existing allocation of
restrictions, burdens, and benefits.  Some of the Founders and classi-
cal formalists extended special protections to private property to pre-
vent the unpropertied majority from redistributing wealth through
census 69.1% of the U.S. population identified themselves as non-Hispanic white,
12.5% Hispanic, 12.1% African American, and 3.6% Asian American.  See ELIZABETH
M. GRIECO & RACHEL C. CASSIDY, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, OVERVIEW OF RACE
AND HISPANIC ORIGIN:  2000, at 10 (Mar. 2001) (showing race and Hispanic origin
data), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-1.pdf; see also JOHN
A. CLARK & JOHN M. BRUCE, CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS IN GEORGIA 7 (1994) (“In the
1990 Census, the population of Georgia was reported to be 71% white and 27% black.
Our pool of respondents was just over 97% white, with only about 2% black.”);
DEMOCRACY N.C., THE COLOR OF PRESIDENTIAL MONEY:  N.C. CASE STUDY 1 (2003)
(indicating that of North Carolina donors to Republican and Democratic presidential
candidates in 2003, 96% were white), available at http://www.democracy-nc.org/
whatsnew/colormoneyprescharts082003.pdf; Francia, supra note 12, at 30-31 (revealing
that of randomly selected contributors who donated at least $200 to 1996 congres-
sional campaigns, 99% were white).
110
Cf. James A. Gardner, One Person, One Vote and the Possibility of Political Commu-
nity, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1237, 1247 (2002) (“Generally, participation is most meaningful
when . . . citizens can play a significant role in shaping the decisions that affect their
lives.  For this condition to hold, citizens must feel that there is some reasonable pros-
pect for their participation to lead eventually to actions that affect them.” (footnote
omitted)).
111
Cf. Jeffrey L. Harrison, Class, Entitlement and Contract, in LAW AND ECONOMICS:
NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 221, 229 (Robin Paul Malloy & Christopher K. Braun
eds., 1995) (“Disadvantaged people come to believe that the world is right when they
are told how little they have to offer, how little they are entitled to and that they are
ultimately to blame.”).
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the political sphere.112  Although courts now give greater deference to
democratic judgments regarding property, the call to ignore wealth
disparities—in the campaign finance context and in political dis-
course generally—may have a similar effect of preventing democratic
institutions from prioritizing and responding to evolving problems
and the needs of society as a whole.113
In summary, the antireformers’ lack of concern about disparities
in wealth stems, in part, from an unwavering acceptance of economic
market norms, even though such norms often conflict with demo-
cratic values and objectives.
III.  BROADENING POLITICAL PARTICIPATION BEYOND THE DONOR CLASS
The Supreme Court’s deference to legislative judgments in
McConnell suggests that the political branches serve a unique constitu-
tional function in crafting democratic structure.  In assuming this
role, lawmakers should make the impact of class on participation a
central concern.  As established above, money plays an important role
in politics, wealth is concentrated among narrow segments of society,
and the democratic process features values and objectives that differ
from those in the economic sphere.
This Part articulates a clear goal for campaign reform and pro-
poses initial legislative strategies to reduce the impact of wealth on po-
litical participation.  Rather than focus on restrictions on contribu-
tions and spending,114 this Part analyzes how matching funds and tax
credits for smaller contributions might broaden participation and en-
hance smaller donors’ influence.
112
See NEDELSKY, supra note 17, at 27-28 (explaining that Madison “thought the
protection of property should be a central concern for [a] republican government” to
maintain stability).
113
Cf. id. at 260 (“Why has the judiciary virtually abandoned property in some
forms, but not others?  Why give up the overt formal limits with respect to economic
regulation and social assistance, and enforce the power and privilege of property
against the egalitarian measures of campaign finance laws?”); Frank Michelman, Politi-
cal Truth and the Rule of Law, 8 TEL AVIV U. STUD. L. 281, 288 (1988) (“[I]s it not, after
all, a fair question why realism and relativism should have been such potent destroyers
of juristic absolutism shielding the market manifestations of property rights against
legislative control, but so impotent as the Buckley manifesto implies when it comes to
their manifestations in the political sphere?”).
114
For a discussion of the boundaries of legislative authority over campaign fi-
nance, see Overton, supra note 33, at 666 (“[J]udges lack adequate guidance as to the
point at which reforms go too far in infringing on speech. . . . This Article represents
the first step toward developing a framework that will facilitate more principled judi-
cial review of reforms.”).
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A.  The Problem and the Goal of Reform
Any goal of campaign reform is shaped by one’s understanding of
the problem.  Reformers have used a handful of slogans to describe
their concerns, including complaints that “good candidates cannot af-
ford to run for public office,” “big donors corrupt politics,” and “too
much money is in politics.”  These conceptions of the problem are
vague and incomplete, and the solutions they inspire are often mis-
guided.  Equalizing resources among candidates encourages not only
good candidates but also bad ones to run for office.  Preventing citi-
zens from attempting to influence government officials may stifle
democratic activism and entrench incumbents.  Reducing the amount
of money in politics seems counterproductive, given that Americans
spend more on potato chips than on politics.115
More pressing are the massive imbalances in access to financial re-
sources that cause disparities in citizen participation in campaigns and
in the legislative process.  A wealthy donor class gives large contribu-
tions that constitute the bulk of funding for American politics and de-
termines which candidates will be viable.  In the 2002 election cycle,
0.22% of the voting-age population gave contributions over $200 to
federal candidates.116  This narrow group contributed 76% of the
funds given to federal candidates by individuals.117
Members of the donor class control significant financial resources.
While only 13.4% of American households earned at least $100,000 in
2000,118 one study showed that 85.7% of contributions over $200 and
93.3% of $1000 contributions came from such households.119  Less
wealthy Americans were better represented among smaller contribu-
tors.  For example, 73.5% of contributions of $100 or less came from
households with incomes of less than $100,000.120
The goal of campaign reform should be to reduce the impact of disparities
in wealth on the ability of different groups of citizens to participate in poli-
115
See Smith, supra note 1, at 1059 (“Americans spend more than twice as much
money each year on yogurt, and two to three times as much on the purchase of potato
chips, as they do on political campaigns.” (footnote omitted)).
116
LIOZ & CASSADY, supra note 8, at 54.
117
See id. at 53 (indicating that in the 2002 congressional elections, 55.5% of funds
given to federal candidates by individuals came from contributors of $1000 and 76% of
funds given to federal candidates by individuals came from contributors of $200 or
more).
118
DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 11, at 17 tbl.A-1.
119
See Wilcox July 3, 2004 Chart, supra note 10 (charting demographic data on
contributors to presidential candidates during 2000 primaries).
120
Id.
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tics.121  Rather than focus on candidate corruption or candidate
equalization, campaign reform should empower more citizens to par-
ticipate in the funding of campaigns.  This goal builds on the partici-
patory self-government objective articulated by the Supreme Court in
McConnell and calls for reforms that prompt “candidates and political
committees to raise funds from a greater number of persons”122 and
“tangibly benefit public participation in political debate.”123
The impact of disparities in wealth might be immediately reduced
by reforms that work to create a system in which candidates, political
parties, and PACs receive a larger percentage of their funds from a
greater number of people in smaller contribution amounts.124  Two
specific numerical targets might promote clarity, especially when
compared to preventing “corruption” and other cloudy goals that cur-
rent reforms pursue.  First, reforms should work to increase the num-
ber of people who give money to candidates, parties, or PACs in a
121
Cf. David A. Strauss, What Is the Goal of Campaign Finance Reform?, 1995 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 141, 141 (observing that one cannot determine whether campaign finance
reform is needed, and what reforms might be in order, until one identifies “what the
objective of any reform effort should be”).
122
McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 656 (2000) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 21-22 (1976) (per curiam)).
123
Id. at 656.  Although the Court in McConnell alluded to a participatory self-
government rationale in upholding the ban on soft money, other provisions of BCRA
enhanced the political advantages enjoyed by wealthier individuals.  For example, the
law increased the amount an individual can give to a federal candidate from $1000 to
$2000, and it increased the annual aggregate amount an individual can give to candi-
dates, PACs, and parties from $25,000 to $95,000.  BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, sec.
307, § 315(a)(3), 116 Stat. 81, 102–03 (2002).  In the 2003-2004 election cycle, contri-
butions of $2000 represented 44% of the money individuals donated to Republican
President George W. Bush and 24% of such money donated to Democratic presiden-
tial nominee John Kerry.  See Campaign Fin. Inst., supra note 9, at tbl.3 (indicating sizes
of contributions given to presidential candidates).
124
President Kennedy recognized the importance of broadening participation in
the financing of campaigns:
In these days when the public interest demands basic decisions so essential to
our security and survival, public policy should enable presidential candidates
to free themselves of dependence on large contributions of those with special
interests. Accordingly, it is essential to broaden the base of financial support for can-
didates and parties. To accomplish this, improvement of public understanding
of campaign finance, coupled with a system of incentives for solicitation and
giving, is necessary.
Letter from President John F. Kennedy to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House Transmitting Bills to Carry out Recommendations of the Com-
mission on Campaign Costs (May 29, 1962), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES:  JOHN F. KENNEDY 1962, at 444 (1963) (emphasis added), available
at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/site/docs/print_pppus.php?admin=035&year=1962&
id=219.
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given cycle to at least 50% of the voting-age population.  Second, con-
tributions of $100 or less should account for 75% of the money raised
by average candidates, parties, and PACs.125  Reforms need not pro-
duce these results immediately, but should increase participation by
smaller contributors in each election cycle in increments sufficient to
reach the ultimate goals within a generation.  Some may argue for
lower or higher numerical goals; the targets could be adjusted based
on further deliberation.
B.  One Proposal:  Matching Funds and Tax Credits to
Enhance Small Contributors’ Influence
The preceding discussion identified the problem of wealth’s im-
pact on democratic participation and provided a normative goal of
campaign reform.  This Part now turns from the abstract discussion of
wealth and political participation to a practical proposal that is likely
to move our political process toward the goal articulated above.
Lawmakers should provide incentives for a broader and more di-
verse group of Americans to make small contributions and enhance
the effect of their participation by adopting matching funds and tax
credits for contributions of $100 or less.
The reform would provide a four-to-one match for contributions
of $100 or less.  In other words, if a contributor gives $100 to a candi-
date, the candidate would receive another $400 in public funds, pro-
ducing a total contribution worth $500.
The second provision of the reform would make it easier for indi-
viduals to donate by providing a tax credit for smaller contributions.
For example, a contributor who gives $100 to a candidate would re-
ceive a tax credit that reduces her tax bill by $100.  The tax credit
would be limited to $100 per year (or $200 for joint returns), refund-
able so that poorer families who do not pay taxes could use it, and well
125
The percentage of a candidate’s funds that comes from smaller contributions is
a much more important number than average contribution size.  For example, imag-
ine Candidate A collects seventy-five $10 contributions and twenty-five $2000 contribu-
tions, and Candidate B collects five hundred $100 contributions.  They both have an
average contribution size of $100 and they both raise about the same amount (Candi-
date A has $50,750 and Candidate B has $50,000).  Nonetheless, the two candidates
rely on different types of contributors for the bulk of their funds.  Candidate A has
raised 99% of his funds from $2000 contributors, whereas Candidate B raised 100% of
his funds from $100 contributors.  Note also that Candidate A has a contributor pool
of only 100 people, whereas Candidate B has engaged 500 people.
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publicized to ensure that its use would not be limited to those who
can afford attentive accountants.
Congress should adopt such a system for contributions to all fed-
eral parties, PACs, and presidential and congressional candidates
when it considers revising the federal presidential funding system.126
States and localities should adopt such plans, either through the legis-
lative process or via ballot initiative, for contributions to state and lo-
cal parties, PACs, and candidates for state and local executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial offices.
1.  The Combination of Technology and
Law Enhances Participation
Matching funds and tax credits for smaller contributions, com-
bined with emerging technology, would provide incentives for a
broader and more diverse group of Americans to participate in politi-
cal campaigns and would enhance the effect of their participation.
Under my proposal, matching funds will self-evidently multiply the
importance of smaller contributors fivefold.  Under the current sys-
tem, many candidates think they can most efficiently raise large sums
by appealing to larger contributors.  By increasing the value of a $100
contribution to $500, the matching fund system increases the gain
candidates realize by reaching out to smaller contributors.
A more difficult empirical question is whether the tax credit will
prompt more people to give small contributions.  Only about 5% of
taxpayers used the 50% federal tax credit for political contributions
before it was eliminated in 1986.127
126
In the 2004 presidential primary, Republican George W. Bush and Democratic
presidential candidates Howard Dean and John Kerry rejected public funding, claim-
ing that they did not want to be subject to the $45 million spending limitation required
as a condition to accept $19 million in matching public funds.  See Glen Justice, Kerry
Lends Campaign $850,000 and Plans More, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2003, at A36 (explaining
that Kerry followed Dean and Bush in opting out of taxpayer financing for the primary
season).  The Presidential Funding Act was introduced in Congress to update the
presidential public funding system for the 2008 election.  The bill encourages more
candidates to accept public funding by increasing the amount participating candidates
can spend from $45 million up to $75 million.  S. 1913, 108th Cong. § 4 (2003).  The
bill also gives four-to-one matching funds on the first $250 of a contribution to a par-
ticipating candidate.  S. 1913, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003).  A proposed amendment to this
provision, which would give candidates a four-to-one match only on contributions of
$100 or less, is discussed infra Part III.B.2.
127
See David Rosenberg, Broadening the Base:  The Case for a New Federal Tax
Credit for Political Contributions 8 (2002) (unpublished white paper, on file with
author) (showing that the average use of federal tax credit was 4.9% for 1980 to 1986).
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Several factors, however, suggest that the proposed full tax credit,
when combined with other measures, will stimulate broader participa-
tion.  The full tax credit provides more incentive to participate than
the 50% federal tax credit.  Extending the tax credit and matching
funds to contributions to PACs and parties gives these entities an in-
centive to promote the plan and develop a permanent base of small
donors.128  Further, the accompanying matching funds increase the im-
pact of small contributions, which would boost the incentive of
smaller contributors to give.  Finally, emerging technology makes par-
ticipation by smaller contributors easier than ever.
Politicians realized the potential of Internet fundraising when
John McCain collected $5.6 million online in the month following
his surprise win in the 2000 New Hampshire Republican primary.129  By
2004, Democratic presidential candidate Howard Dean claimed to
have raised half of his funds online,130 and 59% of Dean’s campaign
funds from individual contributions came from contributions of less
than $200.131  Due in part to increased Internet giving, contributions
Other writings that discuss the potential of broadening political participation through
tax credits for contributions include JOHN M. DE FIGUEIREDO & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
PAYING FOR POLITICS (Univ. of S. Cal. L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 04-19, 2004),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=578304; Robert G. Boatright & Michael J. Mal-
bin, Campaign Fin. Inst., Political Contribution Tax Credits and Citizen Participation
(2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
128
Thomas Cmar, U.S. Pub. Interest Research Group, Toward a Small Donor De-
mocracy:  The Past and Future of Incentive Programs for Small Political Contributions 36, 38-39
(2004) (asserting that extending tax credits to contributions to PACs and political par-
ties will increase participation from smaller donors), available at http://uspirg.org/
uspirg.asp?id2=14231&id3=uspirg& (last accessed Oct. 8, 2004).  Although my proposal
is limited to matching funds and tax credits for small contributions to candidates, par-
ties, and PACs, a strong argument exists for extending these devices to contributions to
501(c)(4) advocacy organizations and ballot question campaigns.  Internal Revenue
Code § 501(c)(4) provides for exemption from federal income tax of civic leagues or
organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of
social welfare.  See RAYMOND CHICK & AMY HENCHEY, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND
IRC 501(C)(4), at 1 (discussing exemptions for social welfare organizations), available
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicm95.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2004).  Ex-
tending these devices would offset the impact of wealth on the ability of the less
wealthy to participate in public debate generally.
129
See Jeff Glasser & Betsy Streisand, Virtual Campaign Pays Off, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Mar. 6, 2000, at 22, 22 (“McCain’s Web appeal by the end of last week
had raised a mighty $5.6 million, about a quarter of his total take.”).
130
See Jon Sawyer, Dean’s Savvy Web Pros Are Changing Political Campaigns, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 11, 2004, at E3 (indicating that Internet fundraising “has ac-
counted for fully half of the $40 million Dean has raised”).
131
Campaign Fin. Inst., supra note 9, at tbl.3 (indicating sizes of contributions
given to presidential candidates).
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of less than $200 increased from 25% of funds from individuals raised
by all presidential candidates in 2000 to 34% in 2004.132  Unlike raising
money through channels such as telemarketing and direct mail, which
can cost fifty cents for every dollar raised, advocates estimate that
Internet fundraising costs as little as ten to twenty cents per dollar
raised.133
While the Internet is an important tool, technology alone is an in-
sufficient instrument for broadening participation from a diverse
cross-section of Americans.  First, Internet use and access varies across
comunities.  Internet users control more financial resources than other
Americans.134 Currently, nearly one-quarter of Americans remain “off-
line.”135  Further, the impact of disparities in wealth and the demo-
cratic value of widespread political participation are of such signifi-
cance that we should not wait passively to see whether the Internet
alone will eventually stimulate financial participation from a majority
of voting-age Americans and shift the bulk of candidate funding from
the donor class to contributors of $100 or less.  Thus, while the Inter-
net sets the stage for the successful implementation of matching funds
and tax credits, legal tools should not be abandoned as part of a com-
prehensive strategy to broaden and diversify participation in cam-
paign funding by smaller contributors.
2.  Line Drawing and Value Judgments
Several regulatory details affect the probability that a reform will
enhance the influence of the less wealthy.  These are ultimately line-
drawing questions that involve balancing values such as fairness,
administrability, and cost.  The goal of this Subpart is not to resolve
these disputes but to identify some of the most pressing issues that will
arise in policy deliberations.  While the answers to these questions
132
Id.
133
See Aravind Adiga, Net Lifts Campaign Finance Stakes, FIN. TIMES, July 4, 2000, at 5.
134
See David Guzman, Against All Odds, CIO MAG., May 1, 2004, at 45-46 (“In fall
2000, the Department of Commerce published statistics that showed that about 78
percent of households with annual incomes of $75,000 or more had access to the
Internet, while only 13 percent of households with annual incomes of $15,000 or less
had access.”), available at 2004 WL 67900294.
135
See AMANDA LENHART, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, THE EVER SHIFTING
INTERNET POPULATION:  A NEW LOOK AT INTERNET ACCESS AND THE DIGITAL DIVIDE 3
(2003) (“Some 24% of Americans are truly offline; they have no direct or indirect
experience with the Internet.”), available at http://www.pewtrusts.com/pdf/
vf_pew_internet_shifting_pop.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2004).
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carry important implications,136 adoption of any of the perspectives
discussed in this Subpart would likely result in a campaign finance sys-
tem that more effectively promotes participation than does the status
quo.
The first issue involves the size of contributions that qualify for
matching funds and the amount of the match.  The Presidential
Funding Act, introduced in Congress in 2003 to update the presiden-
tial public funding system for the 2008 election, gives four-to-one
matching funds for the first $250 of a contribution (a “first-$250
match”).137  Proponents of amending the bill argue that Congress should
abandon the four-to-one match on the first $250 of a contribution and
instead give candidates a four-to-one match only on contributions
of $100 or less (a “$100-or-less match”).138  The $100-or-less match
would deny matching funds when any individual’s contributions ex-
ceed $100.  Thus, the $250 and $100 matches differ in both amount
and structure.  A $1000 contribution disqualifies the donor for the
$100 match, while the $250 match would still apply to the first $250
and make the donor’s contribution worth $2000 to the candidate.
Proponents of the first-$250 match might argue that by giving a
larger match on all contributions, candidates would receive more pub-
lic funds quickly and spend less time fundraising.  The law should not
discriminate against larger contributors simply because they donate
more, one might argue, and the $100-or-less match discourages indi-
viduals from giving between $101 and $500 (as doing so would dis-
qualify their candidate from receiving the additional $400 in public
funds).  A $100-or-less match thus infringes on the expressive inter-
ests of those who want to show greater intensity in supporting their
particular candidate.  The $100-or-less match also poses administra-
tive difficulties:  regulators would have to track and disqualify from
matching funds those $100 contributions by individuals who gave
136
See Cmar, supra note 128, at 5 (“A careful study of experience at both the state
and federal levels reveals that the structure of a contribution incentive program plays a
significant role in determining its success.”).
137
See S. 1913, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003) (providing four-to-one matching funds on
the first $250 of a contribution to a presidential candidate).  Note that the Presidential
Funding Act provides matching funds for presidential primaries.  This Article proposes
that matching funds and tax credits be expanded to apply to small contributions given
to all federal candidates, parties, and PACs in primary and general elections, and that
states and localities, either through the legislative or initiative processes, adopt similar
reforms for state and local campaigns.
138
See Spencer Overton, Editorial, Campaign Reform’s Next Step, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 12, 2003, at A35 (“[W]e should not give a public subsidy to contributions over
$100 . . . .”).
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separate contributions on other occasions such that their aggregate
gift exceeded $100.139
Proponents of the $100-or-less match might respond that a four-
to-one match on the first $250 of a contribution adds a $1000 public
subsidy to a $2000 contribution, making it worth $3000 to a candidate.
Because many candidates presently think they can raise the most
money by appealing to larger contributors, this public subsidy simply
gives candidates more incentive to cater to the donor class.  The ob-
jective of matching funds should be to increase the importance of the
smaller contributor, and using taxpayer funds to subsidize $2000 con-
tributions is counterproductive because it diminishes the relative im-
portance of smaller contributors.  Although the $100-or-less match
discourages contributions of between $101 and $500, those interested
in expressing greater support could encourage a friend to give $100,
thereby broadening participation and yielding another $500 for the
candidate.  Finally, technology resolves administrative burdens by al-
lowing the FEC to review electronically the list of donors and ensure it
awards matching funds only for contributions by individuals who give
no more than a total of $100.140
Similar questions revolve around whether the tax credit should be
limited to households with incomes under $100,000.  Some might ar-
gue that as a matter of fairness, both a wealthy person and a poor per-
son should be entitled to claim the same tax credit for a $100 contri-
bution to a candidate.  On the other hand, extending the tax credit to
households earning more than $100,000 increases the cost of the pro-
gram without any significant benefit, assuming that such households
do not need incentives to make small contributions.  Indeed, house-
holds earning more than $100,000 represented 37% of those that
139
Without administrative oversight, the $100-or-less match could be circum-
vented if an individual were to give twenty $100 checks to a candidate.  The same dan-
ger of circumvention, however, exists when a contributor gives eight $250 contribu-
tions under either the current FEC review for one-to-one matching funds for the first
$250 of a contribution or the Presidential Funding Act’s proposed four-to-one match
on the first $250 of a contribution.
140
Proponents of the $100-or-less match might favor regulations that require
that, when a candidate electronically submits names of contributors to the Federal
Election Commission on a monthly basis for disclosure purposes and to receive match-
ing funds, the FEC perform a computer cross-check to ensure matching funds be
awarded only for contributions by individuals who contributed less than $100 that par-
ticular month or earlier months.  The FEC would also subtract matching funds from a
candidate who received matching funds earlier for a contributor whose aggregate con-
tributions in the most recent month totaled over $100.
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claimed a state tax credit for political contributions in Ohio in 1999.141
Another concern with tax credits is that poorer populations may
be less willing to part with $100 for several months until it is refunded
through the tax credit. In response, one might explore refunding the
amount contributed within a few weeks.142  Any such proposal that de-
viates from the normal tax cycle, however, would likely face concerns
about administrability and fraud.143
3.  Politics, Entrenchment, and the Cost
Matching funds and tax credits may be more politically feasible
than other forms of public financing.
Both tax credits and matching funds have a proven track record
and an existing administrative infrastructure.  Six states currently pro-
vide tax credits for political contributions (Arizona, Arkansas, Minne-
sota, Ohio, Oregon, and Virginia),144 and a 50% federal tax credit was
available from 1972 to 1986.145  The federal presidential primary sys-
tem currently provides up to $250 of matching funds for the first $250
of a contribution.146  The existing tax infrastructure and federal
matching fund process could administer the programs in all federal
elections.
While direct grants of equal amounts of public funding to candi-
dates might be labeled “welfare for politicians” that suppress citizen
participation until election-day voting, tax credits and matching funds
allow citizens to shape the deliberative process by directly supporting
141
See Rosenberg, supra note 127, at 13 (“[I]n Ohio claims by households earning
more than $100,000 per year rose from 25% of total claims in 1995 to 37% in 1999.”).
142
See id. at 14 (“The Minnesota system gets money back into contributors’ hands
within six weeks—a strong incentive for citizens to ‘loan’ money to candidates and for
candidates to seek those loans.”).
143
See id. (“As a simple, practical reality, creating a whole new system for refunding
citizens’ campaign contributions is fraught with the potential for fraud, delay, and
misdirected funds and is probably too cumbersome to be introduced at the federal
level.  But following Minnesota’s lead, some states may be able to implement an effec-
tive rapid refund loop.”).
144
See id. at 9 (“Today, six states provide some sort of tax credit for contributions
to candidates, parties and/or PACs.”); see also Cmar, supra note 128, at 19 (indicating
that technically, “Minnesota takes a slightly different approach, operating a Political
Contributions Refund (‘PCR’) program outside of its tax system”).
145
See Rosenberg, supra note 127, at 7, 9 (showing federal tax incentives for 1972
through 2002).
146
In the 2004 presidential primary, candidates who abided by $45 million spend-
ing limits were entitled to up to $19 million in matching public funds.  See Justice, su-
pra note 126, at A36.
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candidates they favor.  These reforms also allow those without great
wealth to use money to convey the intensity of their support.  Further,
unlike restrictions that can be said to drain money from get-out-the-
vote efforts and other political activity, matching funds and tax credits
respect the fact that politics requires money and simply broadens the
source of available funds.
Some might assert that a voucher system, such as the plan pro-
posed by Yale Law School Professors Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres
in Voting With Dollars,147 would better minimize the impact of dispari-
ties in wealth.148  Under Ayres and Ackerman’s proposal, Congress
would give every voter a special credit card or voucher worth $50 that
the voter could use to finance the campaigns of his or her favorite
federal candidates.149  To prevent corruption, the authors propose that
the identity of contributors remain anonymous.150
While Voting With Dollars articulates important principles that are
consistent with reducing the relevance of disparities in wealth, Ayres
and Ackerman’s proposal is less feasible than offering matching funds
and tax credits.  For example, anonymous donations would under-
mine the benefits of full disclosure.  As explained above, matching
funds and tax credit programs have enjoyed bipartisan support and
have operated successfully in several states.151  Ayres and Ackerman’s
147
ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 25 (outlining a proposal for reforming cam-
paign finance to reflect some of the more democratic qualities of secret-ballot voting);
see also Foley, supra note 14, at 1204 (“The Constitution of the United States should
contain a principle, which I shall call ‘equal-dollars-per-voter,’ that would guarantee to
each eligible voter equal financial resources for purposes of supporting or opposing
any candidate or initiative on the ballot in any election held within the United
States.”); Hasen, supra note 14, at 20-27 (arguing for a voucher system of campaign fi-
nance reform).
148
See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 147, at 43 (rejecting matching fund systems
because Americans “should not be required to sacrifice private goods” to support can-
didates financially, and asserting that “[o]nly by combining votes and Patriot dollars
can citizens regain a semblance of popular sovereignty in today’s world”).
149
See id. at 4, 182 (indicating that “separate subaccounts will potentially be associ-
ated with each Patriot card:  $10 for House elections, $15 for senatorial elections; and
$25 for presidential elections”).
150
Id. at 6.
151
Perhaps because of conservative opposition to taxes, organizations as diverse as
the American Enterprise Institute and the Public Interest Research Group have sup-
ported a federal tax credit for financial contributions to federal campaigns. See Rosen-
berg, supra note 127, at 7-20 (identifying and discussing themes that emerge from
states’ experiences with tax credit programs); Press Release, Colo. Pub. Interest Re-
search Group Student Chapters, Biggest Fundraisers Dominate Michigan Elections:
PIRGIM Report Uncovers Big Money’s Influence On Election Outcomes (Oct. 15,
2002) (“PIRGIM called for . . . tax credits for small political contributions . . . to level
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proposal lacks this track record.  In short, matching contributions and
tax credits merge the ideals of widespread participation with more
pragmatic proposals.
Practical strategies for reform should also anticipate the concerns
of incumbent politicians, whose support is needed to enact the re-
form.  Antireformers favor market distribution with minimal legal in-
tervention due to their distrust of incumbent officials.  By setting con-
tribution limits too low or manipulating reforms in some other
manner, the argument goes, entrenchment-minded incumbents will
prevent insurgents from raising enough money to mount effective
challenges.152  Campaign finance systems that rely more heavily on
status quo market distribution, however, also entrench incumbents
and contribute to legislative inaction.  Incumbents often receive more
large contributions from the donor class than challengers do.153  Thus,
reforms like public funding sometimes fail in the legislative arena be-
cause incumbents hesitate to relinquish the funding advantages they
enjoy over challengers.154
Matching funds and tax credits differ from other reforms because,
rather than shifting the balance between candidates, they empower
less wealthy citizens.  Certainly, many incumbents will assess their
prospects for reelection under the program before supporting it.  But
the answer will not be as clear as it would be with equal public funding
the playing field for non-wealthy candidates and voters.”), available at http://www.
copirgstudents.org/cocampus.asp?id2=8235 (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).
152
Cf. Robert Bauer, When “the “Pols Make the Calls”:  McConnell’s Theory of Judicial
Deference in the Twilight of Buckley, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 5, 19-26 (2004) (asserting that
deference to congressional judgment neglects the reality and history of officeholder
self-interest); Charles J. Cooper & Derek L. Shaffer, What Congress “Shall Make” the Court
Will Take:  How McConnell v. FEC Betrays the First Amendment in Upholding Incumbency
Protection Under the Banner of “Campaign Finance Reform,” 3 ELECTION L. J. 223, 227-28
(2004) (“McConnell v. FEC bestows the Supreme Court’s imprimatur upon the ‘legisla-
tive judgment’ of Congress . . . despite an overwhelming record demonstrating that the
intent and effect of Title II [of BCRA] are to protect incumbents against meaningful
electoral challenge.”).
153
See PUBLIC CAMPAIGN, supra note 5 (indicating that in the 2000 election cycle
Senate incumbents “raised, on average, nearly three times as much as their challengers
did from donors of $1,000 or more” and that House incumbents “raised more than
twice as much from donors of $1,000 or more as their challengers,” and stating that
“[h]ard money remained the dominant source of campaign funding in the 2000 elec-
tion cycle outweighing party soft money by a ratio of 4.4 to 1”).
154
Cf. Jennifer Fenn, House Budget Wipes Out Funding for Clean Elections, Cuts Medi-
care, LOWELL SUN (Mass.), May 17, 2002 (“The House approved a $22.8 billion budget
yesterday that wipes out funding for the voter-approved campaign-finance law and
spends the money on state union contracts, a move seen by critics as a snub to voters
and to the state’s highest court.”).
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for challengers and incumbents.  Further, incumbents may enhance
the quality of their professional and personal lives by spending less
time outside of their districts soliciting large contributions from the
donor class and more time at home with constituents, whose smaller
contributions are multiplied in value.
The cost of matching funds and tax credits is also reasonable, es-
pecially in view of the need to ensure fair representation of all citizens
in deliberations regarding hundreds of billions of dollars in tax reve-
nues and government expenditures.  Total spending by federal candi-
dates and political parties was $2.8 billion in the 2000 election cycle
and $2.1 billion in the 2002 election cycle.155
In light of past spending and the presence of private funds in a
matching fund and tax credit system, a federal allocation of $3 billion
every other year (or about $13 per voting-age resident of the United
States) should more than cover the cost of a matching fund and tax
credit system based on private contributions.156  By comparison, the
U.S. Senate approved a 2005 budget that provides $421 billion in de-
155
These numbers are based on total disbursements by major and minor federal
parties and congressional candidates of major and minor parties in the 2000 and 2002
election cycles.  See The Big Picture, 2000 Cycle, The Price of Admission, Ctr. for Responsive
Politics (n.d.), at http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/stats.asp?cycle=2000&type=
A&display=T (last visited Sept. 15, 2004) (showing campaign spending for congres-
sional elections in 2000); News Release, Fed. Election Comm’n, Party Committees
Raise More than $1 Billion in 2001-2002 (Mar. 20, 2003) (indicating total federal and
nonfederal disbursements by major federal party committees in 2002 election cycle),
available at http://www.fec.gov/press/press2003/20030320party/20030103party.html;
News Release, Fed. Election Comm’n, FEC Reports Increase in Party Fundraising for
2000 (May 15, 2001), available at http://www.fec.gov/press/press2001/051501
partyfund/051501partyfund.html (indicating total federal and nonfederal disburse-
ments by major federal party committees in 2000 election cycle); E-mail from Sheila
Krumholz, Research Director, Center for Responsive Politics, to Spencer Overton, As-
sociate Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School (June 28,
2004, 13:12:07 EST) (on file with the author) (indicating total spending for minor par-
ties in 2000 and 2002 election cycles and spending for all presidential candidates in
2000 election cycle).
156
If we reached the goal of 50% of voting-age residents of the United States mak-
ing a small contribution, and if these contributions were all $100 and received a $100
tax credit and a $400 match for the candidate (a total of $500), the cost would be
about $55 billion per election.  In light of the significance of this amount and the fact
that the primary objective is to spark broader participation and increase the propor-
tion of funds raised from smaller contributors, Congress might decide to limit the pub-
lic funds to $3.0 billion per election cycle (in 2004 dollars) and reduce incentives as
the percentage of participation by smaller contributors increases (e.g., as participation
increases, drop the match from four-to-one down to three-to-one, etc.).  In the alterna-
tive, Congress might simply provide the public subsidy to the first $3.0 billion in small
contributions to be collected by candidates, parties, and PACs.
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fense spending, $15.6 billion for NASA, $29.2 billion for natural re-
sources and the environment, $13.3 billion for the No Child Left Be-
hind Act, $30.5 billion in discretionary spending, and tax cuts of $144
billion between 2005 and 2009.157
To avoid the possibility that a future group of politicians would
cut tax credits and matching funds to suppress citizen participation,158
Congress could alternatively make a one-time allocation to establish a
$63 billion trust that invests its funds in a low-risk vehicle.  Such a trust
would fund federal tax credits and matching funds for several hun-
dred years and perhaps in perpetuity.159
Granted, tax credits and matching funds will not offset all of the
problems that disparities in wealth cause.  Just as people who lack re-
sources are less likely to vote,160 a disproportionately high percentage
of lower-income people will likely fail to contribute.  Poorer people
will be less able to part with $100 until it is refunded in the form of a
tax credit, and wealthier Americans will likely continue to be overrep-
resented even among those who give smaller contributions.161  As a re-
sult, many reformers who agree that disparities in wealth unfairly af-
fect democratic participation may press for more dramatic reforms.
Nevertheless, while matching funds and tax credits will not solve all
157
For the Record, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2004, at T13.  An annual expense of $1.5
billion to support citizen political participation through matching funds and tax cred-
its is also reasonable relative to the almost $40 billion in tax credits awarded every year
to subsidize other activities.  See Individual Income Tax Returns:  Selected Income and Tax
Items for Specified Tax Years, 1985-2002, Internal Revenue Serv. (2004), at http://www.
irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02in01si.xls (last visited August 28, 2004) (indicating that Ameri-
can taxpayers claimed tax credits of $37.7 billion, $45.6 billion, and $38.9 billion in
2000, 2001, and 2002 respectively).
158
Congress repealed the 50% federal tax credit in the comprehensive tax reform
package of 1986.  See Rosenberg, supra note 127, at 7 (“[I]n the sprit of Reagan-era ‘tax
simplification,’ the federal tax credit for political contributions was repealed in the
comprehensive tax reform package of 1986.”).  Of course, some would argue that
Congress did not do this to entrench itself, but to simplify the tax code.
159
This estimate is based upon assumptions of a tax-free average annual return of
6% on a thirty-year U.S. Treasury bond, an average annual inflation rate of 3.5%, and a
program cost of $3.0 billion (in 2004 dollars) every other year.
160
See AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN AN
AGE OF RISING INEQUALITY 6 (2004) (“Nearly nine out of 10 individuals in families with
incomes over $75,000 reported voting in presidential elections while only half of those
in families with incomes under $15,000 reported voting.”), available at http://www.
apsanet.org/Inequality/taskforcereport.pdf.
161
Although households with incomes of at least $100,000 represented only about
13.4% of the U.S. population in 2000, they accounted for 26.5% of contributions of
$100 or less.  DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 11, at 22; Wilcox July 3, 2004 Chart,
supra note 10.
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problems,162 they represent an important first step toward using tested
legal tools to broaden participation beyond the donor class.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in McConnell v. FEC signaled
that the political branches serve an important function in structuring
the role of money in democracy.  Although some would prefer to ig-
nore disparities in wealth, the true problem of campaign finance is
that massive disparities in wealth cause disparities in citizen participa-
tion.  A relatively small and wealthy donor class provides the bulk of
funding for American politics and determines which candidates will
run viable campaigns.  Reforms such as matching funds and tax cred-
its for smaller contributions would broaden participation, increase the
importance of the smaller contributors, and lessen the impact of dis-
parities in wealth on political participation.
162
Demographic information on contributors to presidential primary candidates
in the 2000 election cycle suggests that reforms that empower smaller contributors are
more likely to result in economic diversification of contributors compared to gender,
age, racial, and educational attainment diversification.  Households with incomes un-
der $100,000 accounted for a much larger percentage of $100-or-less contributions
(73.5%) than contributions over $200 (14.4%).  In contrast, women, people under 50,
people without a college degree, and people of color were grossly underrepresented
not only among contributors of amounts over $200, but also among contributors of
$100 or less.  For example, although individuals without a college degree made up
74% of adults ages twenty-five or older in the United States in 2000, they accounted for
only 15.7% of contributions over $200 and 23.9% of contributions under $100.  U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED STATES:  MARCH
2000, at 1 (2000), available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/education/
p20-536/p20-536.pdf; Wilcox July 3, 2004 Chart, supra note 10.  It is unclear whether
the underrepresentation among contributors of $100s or less is caused by:  apathy or
feelings of futility; the digital divide; candidate and party targeting of older educated
white males in fundraising; older educated white males who serve as the primary or-
ganizers of fundraisers for candidates and tap into fairly homogenous social networks;
a greater willingness of educated white males to make contributions to find favor with
superiors at work; or a combination of these and other factors.  While reforms that
empower smaller contributors may prompt women and other underrepresented indi-
viduals to realize the importance of their financial gifts and stimulate giving, the extent
of such an impact is uncertain.  Nevertheless, women, younger Americans, people of
color, and individuals without a college degree are less likely to control significant fi-
nancial resources, and reforms that remove economic barriers carry an important ex-
pressive benefit of opportunity and inclusion.
